Master Gang Xiao: The General Meaning of the *Treatise in the Palm* (Part Six)

The General Meaning of the Treatise in the Palm (Part Six)

Now for the third syllogism— Proposition (宗): The ultimate atoms (paramāṇu) the others posit are certainly not real. Reason (因): Because they lack the capacity to give rise to the consciousness that would apprehend them. Example (喻): Whatever lacks the capacity to give rise to the consciousness that apprehends it is certainly not real—like tortoise hair, rabbit horns, or flowers in space.

This syllogism is also missing a dissimilar example (缺异喻).

The three syllogisms build on one another. The outsiders argue that things like ropes, bottles, and clothes can be broken down further, so they aren't real. But when you divide a rope, a bottle, or a garment until no further division is possible, what you're left with is called the paramāṇu—and the paramāṇu, they say, ought to be real. Their logic: what can be analyzed isn't real; what can't be analyzed must be real.

Dignāga responds: since the paramāṇu you posit cannot be divided further, in my first step (the first syllogism) I can show that the paramāṇu is invisible. Because it's invisible, in my second step I can show that it cannot give rise to the manifest activity of the five consciousnesses. And because it cannot give rise to that activity, in my third step I can show that it certainly isn't real.

So much for refuting the paramāṇu from the side of invisibility. Now from the side of visibility.

If the paramāṇu were visible, it would have to possess what is called "differentiation of spatial parts" (方分事差别). What does that mean? Spatial points to direction—east, west, south, north, and so on. Parts refers to the fact of dividing into these directions. Differentiation means that east is not west, south is not north, up is not down, southeast is not northwest, northeast is not southwest. Take a bottle or a garment as an example: one side of the bottle might face a cluster of flowers, the other a school of tadpoles; a garment has its front panel and its back panel—these are all spatial differentiations. The bottle as a whole is composed of the flowers in front and the tadpoles behind; the garment is similarly composed of its front and back panels. Let's work through this again using the three-membered syllogism of Buddhist logic (因明三支论式).

Proposition (宗): The posited paramāṇu must have differentiated spatial parts. Reason (因): Because it is perceptible. Example (喻): Whatever is perceptible must have differentiated spatial parts—like a bottle. Whatever lacks differentiated spatial parts must certainly be imperceptible—like a rabbit horn.

There's no problem with this syllogism: anything visible must have spatial differentiation.

And what follows from spatial differentiation?

Proposition (宗): The posited paramāṇu is certainly not real. Reason (因): Because it has differentiated spatial parts. Example (喻): Whatever has differentiated spatial parts is certainly not real—like a bottle or a garment.

Having spatial differentiation means it isn't real. Each step follows from the last.

Still others claim that a thing cannot be divided—if you divide it, it ceases to be that thing. A bottle, for instance: divide it, and it's no longer a bottle. The same goes for the paramāṇu. What this really means is that its essence is one and indivisible. Dignāga disagrees:

Proposition (宗): The posited paramāṇu is certainly not a single entity. Reason (因): Because it is composed of multiple parts. Example (喻): Whatever is composed of multiple parts is certainly not a single entity—like a bottle or a garment.

Dignāga's point is this: in front of the bottle there are flowers; behind it, tadpoles. True, they are no longer "a bottle"—but so what? Flowers are fine. Tadpoles are fine. Divide a garment and it's no longer a garment; it becomes two pieces, a front panel and a back panel, and those two pieces are absolutely not the same thing. The earth would keep turning just fine without Master Gang Xiao! What would we lose without the bottle?! If the bottle exists in the world, then let it play its role as a bottle; if it doesn't exist, there's nothing to complain about.

The prose passage (长行) at the end of this verse says: "A single real paramāṇu is certainly unattainable. The doctrine of the paramāṇu should therefore be set aside. The wise person, knowing that the entire three realms are nothing but deluded mental fabrications, should not cling to true existence when seeking the deeper principle." The conclusion is the same from both sides—invisibility and visibility: the paramāṇu is not real!