Master Gangxiao: A Millennium of Debate — The Trajectory of Ancient Hetuvidyā

A Millennium of Debate

—The Trajectory of Ancient Hetuvidyā

Gangxiao

India is a great ancient civilization. Around 2300 BCE, human civilization had already taken root in the Indus River Valley (archaeologists have now unearthed seals from the Sargon period dating to before 2300 BCE), but because specific historical materials are lacking, we have to begin with the Vedic period, before 1500 BCE. In the early phase of the Vedic era [gx1] [1], Brahmanical thought held absolute sway, wielding firm ideological control over the people of the time (primarily the Aryans, who arrived in the Indus Valley around 1500 BCE and gave rise to the Vedic civilization). They lived in cheerful contentment—for the Brahmins told them: our Brahmin class sprang from the mouth of Brahmā; your Kshatriya class from his arms; the Vaishyas from his thighs; and the Shudras from his feet (the original passage appears in the middle column of page 0832 of Volume 43 of the Taishō Tripiṭaka). Thus the Brahmins were meant to be the highest class, and the Shudras were born to be the lowest. No one today can clearly trace the origin of this claim, and even people back then couldn't. Yet although no one could say where it came from, generations of conditioning had turned it into something natural and self-evident—a fact to be believed, accepted, and never questioned. So the people of that era went on enjoying their blissful naivety!

As society developed, people's horizons expanded (aided in part by foreign invasions that brought other doctrines along with them). Once their eyes were opened, they stumbled upon a problem: the moment they ventured beyond their own familiar territory, the claim that "Brahmins were born from Brahmā's mouth, Kshatriyas from his arms..." fell apart—people elsewhere had their own quite different origin stories. Gradually the realization dawned: we have heads of our own! What we had taken for granted as self-evident was, in fact, utterly baseless. So people began to question Brahmanical thought and demand explanations from the Brahmins. Because their spheres of activity and the accounts they encountered varied so widely, the doubts they raised were equally diverse. The Brahmins found themselves hard-pressed to keep up. This brings us to the middle period of the Vedic era. At this point, in order to safeguard their ideological dominance, the Brahmins firmly established the Three Aims [2], and around these Three Aims they compiled the Ṛgveda, Sāmaveda, Yajurveda, and Atharvaveda. This is the Brāhmaṇa period of the Vedic era. According to A Cultural History of India: Chronology (Commercial Press, first edition, November 1997), the Ṛgveda was compiled between roughly 1300 and 1000 BCE, while the Brāhmaṇas were compiled between 1000 and 800 BCE. Although the Brahmins compiled the Vedic scriptures (Brāhmaṇas) [3] to shore up their ideological control, the tide of history could not be held back. Challenges to Brahmanical thought surged with mounting force, and the once-monolithic system began to show cracks under the relentless pressure. The earliest doubters may have held unformed views, but in their clashes with the Brahmins, the opposition gradually grew stronger. Among them, some remarkable religious leaders and sages emerged. Riding the wave of anti-Brahmanical sentiment, each put forward their own doctrines and founded their own schools. At this time, the Upaniṣads [4] appeared. Though the Upaniṣads were originally Brahmanical, by then the Brahmins had truly reached the end of their rope—even their own exposition of their thought and teachings had grown inconsistent. So while the Upaniṣads remained formally orthodox Brahmanism, they already contained many incipient anti-Brahmanical elements. This situation nicely illustrates that the Brahmins had been mired in a kind of "people's war," hemmed in by schools of every kind, so much so that even they were losing their bearings. Buddhism was one of the schools surrounding the Brahmins, and indeed the most important one. Later, Buddhism (and Jainism) came to represent the coalition of schools "besieging" Brahmanism (from this point, the history of Indian civilization entered the Buddhist period).

How many schools of thought were there in ancient India at this time? We don't know! The "ninety-six heterodox doctrines" we often hear about were actually just a small fraction—because the ninety-six heterodox doctrines were in fact just ninety-six individuals [5]. How could that possibly reflect the richness and brilliance of the Indian intellectual world of the day? So we can only say, in broad terms, that there were many schools of thought. "When people number over a hundred, they come in all varieties"—the same goes for schools: each had its own claims, its own ideas, and each was convinced it alone held the truth. Naturally, this called for exchange and collision, and so debate began. At first, the various schools shared a common opponent—the Brahmins—so debates were generally directed against the Brahmins (though the schools debated among themselves as well). Once debate arose, ideas and theories about debate gradually took shape. Of course, I'm talking about debate on a sizable scale here, not isolated squabbles. At the time, there was no specialized theory of debate—even Buddhism, the leading opponent of Brahmanism, as far as we can see from its scriptures, had no debate theory. Shakyamuni Buddha's debates were entirely improvised in response to the situation, with no discernible method behind them. Our Master Kuiji observed, "The treatises on Hetuvidyā originated solely from the Buddha's teachings; the words are scattered across the various scriptures with broad and extensive meanings [6]." In earlier times, this was taken to mean "Hetuvidyā originated from the Buddha himself," but today we usually interpret it as: Hetuvidyā (debate) originated in the Buddha's era (the phrase "the words are scattered across the various scriptures with broad and extensive meanings" means that Buddhist scriptures record many instances of various schools debating [with Buddhism]). This neatly confirms what I said earlier: "by this time, debate on a sizable scale had emerged" (it is also generally agreed that the sixth through fourth centuries BCE were a time of unprecedented intellectual ferment in ancient India—an era of "hundred schools of thought").

Under the siege of the various schools led by Buddhism, the traditional Brahmins were "scattered" and routed. The once vast and powerful Brahmanical system splintered into many small factions, six of which became the famous Six Schools of Philosophy—Sāṃkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Yoga, and Vedānta. These six schools began to take shape around the same time as Buddhism was first founded, but their formal establishment didn't come until around the turn of the Common Era. As the Brahmins struggled to resist the encirclement of the other schools, they also reflected: we were once a powerful mainstream of thought—where did things go wrong? Was the problem in our ideas? This was no small matter, and they found it extraordinarily difficult to push their thought to a higher level. Unable to break through on the conceptual front, they took a sideways approach, provisionally proposing some technical methods in the hope of breaking the siege and clawing back some ground. This was the method of Hetuvidyā debate—though the term "Hetuvidyā" didn't exist yet. Under Brahmanical influence, the other schools also put forward their own methods of debate, as Master Shentai put it: "The ninety-five heterodox schools and the Greater and Lesser Vehicles each formulated their own Hetuvidyā [7]." I said earlier that Shakyamuni's debates were quite casual, almost entirely a matter of responding on the spot, with no systematic method to follow. Of course, this wasn't entirely the case; in certain situations, Shakyamuni would also speak of things like "Furthermore, there are four dharmas called the four kinds of eloquence: dharma eloquence, meaning eloquence, word eloquence, and responsive eloquence... Furthermore, there are four dharmas called the four kinds of recorded discussion: determinate recorded discussion, analytical recorded discussion, interrogative recorded discussion, and terminating recorded discussion... (Taishō Tripiṭaka, Volume 1, page 0051)"—remarks related to debate. I now suspect that Master Kuiji said "the treatises on Hetuvidyā originated solely from the Buddha's teachings" precisely because of such passages in the Dīrghāgama.

Debate continued unabated. In Master Xuanzang's Great Tang Records on the Western Regions, there appears this passage: "Those who examined subtle words in deliberation and exalted wondrous principles, with elegant and ample diction, and marvelous eloquence swift and acute, would then ride upon precious elephants, their retinues following like a forest. But when the gates of meaning proved empty and barren, the edge of their rhetoric blunted, when their principles were meager but their words copious, when meaning went awry yet their speech seemed reasonable, they would then have their faces smeared with red ochre, their bodies besmirched with dust, and be cast out into the wilderness, abandoned in ditches and gullies [8]." In other words, if you won a debate, you basked in glory—"riding upon precious elephants, their retinues following like a forest (mounted on elephants, with attendants before and behind, in magnificent array)"; if you lost, the consequences were dire—"faces smeared with red ochre, bodies besmirched with dust (a thorough humiliation), cast out into the wilderness, abandoned in ditches and gullies." And so debate went on, year after year... By the third century BCE, Kauṭilya of the Maurya dynasty wrote a book called Arthashastra; according to Teacher Han, this is a political treatise on the uses of statecraft, and within it there is a section on the theory of debate, putting forward such categories as thesis, statement, inference, analogy, and evidence. Time moved on, and by the second century BCE, the Buddhist Kathāvatthu appeared. This is a Pali Buddhist text containing discussions of debate, and it introduces terminology and formats such as agreement, conclusion, comprehensive knowledge, counterargument, inference, and grounds for defeat. Later still, Jīvaka, the royal physician of King Kaniṣka of the Kushan dynasty, wrote a work called the Charaka Samhita [9]. Since Jīvaka was a physician, the book he wrote was naturally a medical text; yet within it, Jīvaka provided a summary of the debate theory of his time. That political and medical works should contain discussions of debate may seem off-topic (I've only seen introductions to the Arthashastra in secondary sources, and haven't seen the complete Charaka Samhita either, only Mr. Shen Jianying's relevant translations), but summarizing the theory of debate shows the authors' keen eye. The list of debate topics in the Charaka Samhita is quite exhaustive—44 items in all: discussion, substance, property, action, identity, difference, conjunction, proposition, establishing a measure, counter-establishing a measure, reason, example, combination, conclusion, response and refutation, definitive statement, language, direct perception, inference, traditional testimony, analogical testimony, doubt, motivation, uncertainty, desire to know, determination, meaning-based inference, dependent inference, what is challenged, what is not challenged, interrogation, counter-interrogation, verbal faults, verbal excellences, sophistry, non-reason, irrelevance, exposure of faults, refutation, destruction of thesis, admission, dissimilar reason, dissimilar meaning, and grounds for defeat. Although these 44 items are quite thorough, they are ultimately somewhat jumbled. Mr. Shen Jianying reduced them to ten main issues: discussion, methods of argument, proof and refutation, definitive statements, sources of knowledge, deliberation and determination, problems of language, sophistry, false reasons, and grounds for defeat (see his Introduction to the History of Chinese Buddhist Logic).

Next, we come to the Buddhist Upayahrdaya. The Chinese translation attributes no author, listing only "translated by Guṇabhadra (Kekaya), the Western Regions Tripiṭaka master of the Later Wei." Some attribute it to Nāgārjuna, but the text simply cannot be reconciled with Nāgārjuna's other works, and is in fact refuted by them—this settles the matter once and for all: it is not by Nāgārjuna. The Upayahrdaya is entirely devoted to the theory of debate; it opens by saying, "One who can understand this treatise will master the methods of all treatises." The first chapter discusses the "Eight Meanings," stating, "Those who clearly understand these eight meanings will surely be able to master all methods of treatise." The eight are: "first, analogy; second, following one's assertion; third, good speech; fourth, faulty speech; fifth, knowing reasons; sixth, timely speech; seventh, apparent reason that is not reason; eighth, following-word difficulty." The second chapter, "Explanation of Grounds for Defeat," discusses seventeen situations [10]. However, these seventeen situations in the Upayahrdaya are somewhat jumbled—some concern problems with reasons, some concern inelegance of speech during debate, and some concern slow-witted responses, and so on. The third chapter, "On Right Debate," uses concrete examples to illustrate the process of debate. The fourth chapter, "On Correspondence," mainly deals with mistaken challenges and lists twenty situations.

The first truly systematic framework for a complete theory of debate belongs to the Nyāya Sūtra. Nominally, the Nyāya Sūtra was composed by Gautama of the Nyāya school, but in fact it is a work that crystallized the collective wisdom of many. By this time, it was the second century CE. This is the genuine theoretical work on debate—even our Buddhist Master Kuiji acknowledged, "At the beginning of the kalpa, Gautama initiated the distinction between the similar and the dissimilar," thereby affirming the achievements of the Nyāya school (of course, the Nyāya school, for its part, cared little for such Buddhist praise). The Nyāya Sūtra comprises five volumes, each divided into two parts. The first volume lays out the theoretical outline of the Nyāya school—the Sixteen Truths, which modern scholars generally call the Sixteen Categories.

The latter four volumes expand the sixteen truths in detail and engage in debate with other schools, covering all the issues that debate theory touches on. The Religious Culture Publishing House has published a book of mine devoted to explaining the Nyāya Sūtra, so I won't go into it further here. In sum, the Nyāya Sūtra is a "milestone work" in debate theory (in the words of Shen Jianying), and "the first summary of ancient Indian logical thought" (Ishimura)—a work of real importance. It absorbed the debate theories of earlier texts like the Caraka Saṃhitā and the Upāyahṛdaya.

The Nyāya Sūtra gave Buddhism quite a jolt. To Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna, of course, the debates recorded there were hardly worth mentioning, but Nāgārjuna was one of a kind. We can't stake everything on a single figure, however brilliant—after all, even if your whole body were iron, how many nails could you forge? Nāgārjuna disdained hetuvidyā because he was an extraordinary person, and under his influence the Buddhist schools of his time came to look down on it somewhat (his stance drew criticism from the contemporary Master Dharmatrāta). This cost Buddhism dearly. In other words, a sound theoretical system is far more useful than a single outstanding individual. If everyone were outstanding, we wouldn't need a debate theory like hetuvidyā, but that's unrealistic—it runs counter to the Buddhist understanding of causes and conditions. After Nāgārjuna passed away, Buddhism found itself repeatedly on the back foot in debates with other schools and soon slid into a trough. Hetuvidyā, clearly, was still needed.

Bodhisattva Maitreya and Master Asaṅga appeared on the scene, took up the transmission of the Upāyahṛdaya (though Buddhism had engaged in debate as early as the 2nd century BCE in the Kathāvatthu, that can only be called unconscious hetuvidyā), and set about building Buddhism's own theoretical system of hetuvidyā. Building a theoretical system from scratch is no easy matter. From the time Maitreya and Asaṅga began their work of restoration, it took until Master Dignāga for the Buddhist hetuvidyā system to be truly completed. Maitreya gave it a new name—hetuvidyā—and from then on people used that term. He may have done so to set Buddhism apart.

Maitreya's system comprises seven major sections [11]. First, on the nature (svabhāva). The nature includes six aspects, the first of which is "discourse" (bhāṣā). That Maitreya begins with discourse shows a remarkably modern sensibility—much as contemporary philosophy of language must first face the problem of language and metalanguage. For ordinary beings this may be conscious or unconscious; as for bodhisattvas, we should be cautious about guessing their intentions, since they are not working to construct a purely academic system but aiming at liberation from suffering. Still, the fact remains: Maitreya begins with discourse. He calls both vocal sound and words "discourse," and he discusses its intentionality.

Second, the place of debate. This concerns where hetuvidyā debates should be held. Maitreya lists six kinds of places: "the royal court, the residence of those who uphold reason, in public gatherings, before the wise, before śramaṇas and brāhmaṇas skilled in the meaning of the Dharma, and before those who delight in the meaning of the Dharma." Why specify the place? Because, for the sake of truth and liberation, every detail must be handled carefully—nothing can be left to chance. The deeper reason is that in debate one must attend not only to the opponent but also to striking a chord with the audience. The setting (context) matters, because debate is itself a way of propagating one's teaching.

Third, the basis of debate. This has two key points: what is to be established (sādhya) and what can establish it. The proposition is the viewpoint—what one aims to establish. Maitreya required that one clearly state the svabhāva (self-nature) and the viśeṣa (distinguishing features) of what one puts forward; this must be made explicit. As for the establishing factor, Maitreya offers eight meanings, though these touch on both epistemology and forms of argument, and by modern standards the classification is not entirely clear or reasonable—"rather muddled," as Shen Jianying puts it.

Fourth, the adornments of debate. This addresses the craft and grace of debate. Maitreya sets out five requirements: "1. proficiency in one's own and others' schools; 2. perfect expression; 3. fearlessness; 4. dignified composure; 5. worthiness of offerings." Proficiency in one's own and others' schools means knowing both oneself and one's opponent. Perfect expression concerns language ability; Maitreya gives five aspects: "1. not vulgar; 2. light and easy; 3. vigorous and clear; 4. coherent; 5. excellent in meaning." "Not vulgar" means avoiding coarse language and local dialect so that everyone can understand. "Light and easy" means being plain and clear, without pedantry or affectation of profundity. "Vigorous and clear" means good articulation and an engaging tone that moves the audience. "Coherent" means not contradicting oneself. "Excellent in meaning" means conveying the true sense. Fearlessness means projecting an overwhelming presence in debate—though that presence must rest on real substance, not bluster. Maitreya says one must have "no inferiority or constant fear in the heart, no trembling sweat on the body, no look of fear on the face, no stammering in the voice, no weakness in speech." Dignified composure means letting the opponent finish before speaking rather than interrupting mid-argument—a basic courtesy. Worthiness of offerings means guiding the argument along the opponent's own line of reasoning and persuading them.

Fifth, downfall (falling into defeat). Maitreya divides this into three: abandonment of speech, defeat in speech, and transgression in speech. Each is further subdivided below.

Sixth, the criteria for entering or leaving debate. This asks whether one may or should debate at all. One must consider whether the topic is worth debating, whether the opponent and audience are suitable, and whether one has the ability to carry the debate.

Seventh, the qualities for productive debate. This concerns the qualities both sides should possess: "1. proficiency in one's own and others' schools; 2. courageous fearlessness; 3. inexhaustible eloquence." These are the bare minimum.

Compared with the Upāyahṛdaya (and the Nyāya Sūtra), Maitreya's hetuvidyā is really a new drum and a new tune—a freshly lit fire. The raw materials haven't changed much, of course; they couldn't, because the materials are fixed. As for Asaṅga, he largely copies Maitreya almost wholesale on hetuvidyā. For example, in his Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi, the hetuvidyā discussion is identical to Maitreya's. In the Madhyāntavibhāga, Asaṅga mentions the "three characteristics of the reason" (trairūpya)—the property present in the subject, its absence in the contrary subject, and its presence in similar instances [12]. Modern readers interpret the Madhyāntavibhāga text differently, however; the representative views are those of Ju Zonglin and Shen Jianying. Shen Jianying held that the three-characteristic formulation was a foreign theory (he attributes it to Jātukarṇya, a later Nyāya thinker, though Yao Nanqiang, on page 45 of his Outline of the History of Hetuvidyā Theory, attributes it to the Sāṃkhya school), and that Asaṅga aimed to refute it [13]. Ju Zonglin, by contrast, took it as Asaṅga's own three-characteristic theory and rated it even more highly than Dignāga's [14].

Regarding Vasubandhu's hetuvidyā works, tradition attributes to him the Vādavidhi, Vādapadavyākhyā, and Vādahṛdaya, but most have been lost. The Vādahṛdaya survives only in legend; the Vādavidhi and Vādapadavyākhyā are occasionally quoted by later authors. Dignāga explicitly states that the Vādavidhi is not by Vasubandhu and criticizes it in his Pramāṇasamuccaya. There is also a text called the Tattvārtha, specifically its "Counter-objections" chapter, which is attributed to Vasubandhu, though the Chinese translation records only the translator, Paramārtha. According to Lü Cheng, this treatise agrees with the Vādavidhi [15]. If the Tattvārtha and the Vādavidhi are the same work, the implications are serious. But let us follow the traditional attribution here and treat the Tattvārtha as a work of Vasubandhu. Unfortunately, the "Counter-objections" chapter survives only as a fragment, so we cannot discern Vasubandhu's unique contributions to hetuvidyā theory. As for his treatment of erroneous objections and falling into defeat, these appear already in the Upāyahṛdaya and the Nyāya Sūtra; even if Vasubandhu's classification differs and improves on his predecessors, it is hardly unique. What is genuinely significant is his reduction of the debate form from five members to three, his restriction of the valid means of cognition to perception and inference, and his acceptance of the three-characteristic theory (A. K. Warder, A History of Indian Buddhism, trans. Wang Shi'an, Commercial Press, 1987, pp. 412–413). These laid the foundation and pointed the direction for Dignāga's new hetuvidyā, making Vasubandhu the last great master of ancient hetuvidyā.

Notes:

[1] The Vedic period is roughly 1500 BCE to 600 BCE.

[2] The three principles are Vedic revelation, the omnipotence of sacrifice, and the supremacy of the brāhmaṇas.

[3] On the relationship between the Vedas and the Brāhmaṇas, Master Sheng Yen writes: "The long Vedic period included a Brāhmaṇa era, lasting roughly from the 10th to the 5th or 6th century BCE (Gangxiao's note: it should be the 5th or 6th century BCE). The 'three principles' of Brahmanism were established during this time. The Ṛgveda, Sāmaveda, and Atharvaveda were compiled during this period. The Yajurveda opened the prelude to Brāhmaṇa-era thought, and the Brāhmaṇas were the theological works that brought this current of thought to maturity. The Brāhmaṇas greatly elaborated the characteristics of the Yajurveda, attaching to each sacrificial matter its causes, stories, and origins, and explaining them in prose." In other words, the Vedas are verse collections, the Brāhmaṇas are prose—their essential content is the same.

[4] Master Sheng Yen says the Upaniṣads were compiled roughly between 700 and 500 BCE (Gangxiao's note: it should be 500 BCE).

[5] This is just one of the various theories about the ninety-six non-Buddhist paths. The six teachers outside the fold are Pūraṇa Kassapa, Makkhali Gosāla, Saṃjaya Vairāṭīputra, Ajita Kesakambala, Pakudha Kaccāyana, and Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta; each had fifteen disciples, totaling ninety-six people. There is also a view that each of the six teachers had sixteen teachings, one used by the teacher himself and the other fifteen each taught to a disciple, making ninety-six in total.

[6] Taishō Tripiṭaka, vol. 44, page 91, lower register.

[7] Taishō Tripiṭaka, vol. 44, page 77, middle register.

[8] Taishō Tripiṭaka, vol. 51, page 877, upper register.

[9] In Zheng Weihong's General Treatise on Buddhist Logic, page 5, it is written as Cārakasaṃhitā (a different romanization).

[10] Because the original Upāyahṛdaya does not number the items, the exact count varies according to different scholars' groupings. Xu Dishan lists 16 types; Master Shuiyue lists 10. Ui Hakuju and Shen Jianying list 17 types, but their 17 are not the same.

[11] Taishō Tripiṭaka, vol. 30, pages 356–360.

[12] Taishō Tripiṭaka, vol. 30, page 42, upper register.

[13] Shen Jianying's view can be found in A History of Chinese Buddhist Logic (East China Normal University Press, December 2001, 1st ed.), page 6, and in Buddhist Logic (Kaiming Press, October 1992, 1st ed.), page 7. Shen Jianying's text also includes a note attributing this position to Ui Hakuju.

[14] See A Brief History of Tibetan Buddhist Hetuvidyā, Nationalities Publishing House, December 1994, 1st ed., page 103.

[15] See Supplement to the Tripiṭaka, vol. 9, page 236, line 9.

References:

Master Sheng Yen, A History of Indian Buddhism, Putian Guanghua Temple

Ishimura, Essentials of Hetuvidyā, Zhonghua Book Company

Shen Jianying, A History of Chinese Buddhist Logic, East China Normal University Press

Shen Jianying, Buddhist Logic, Kaiming Press

Zheng Weihong, General Treatise on Buddhist Logic, Fudan University Press

Yao Nanqiang, Outline of the History of Hetuvidyā Theory, Shanghai Joint Publishing

Ju Zonglin, A Brief History of Tibetan Buddhist Hetuvidyā, Nationalities Publishing House

A. L. Basham, A Cultural History of India, Commercial Press

Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Commercial Press

Li Zhifu, Indian Philosophy and Its Fundamental Spirit, Hongye Cultural Enterprise Co., Ltd.