Ven. Gangxiao: An Overview of the *Hastavālaprakaraṇa*, Part Five

An Overview of the Hastavālaprakaraṇa, Part Five

Verse Three: Since partless things cannot be seen, what is reduced to the utmost is equally non-existent. They are only posited by deluded, confused mind; the wise should not cling.

Commentary. If someone again insists that various conventionally designated entities, when reduced to the state of the paramāṇu (ultimate atom), cannot be further analyzed and possess no spatial parts, and are therefore truly existent—this is just like sky-flowers and hare’s horns, which cannot be seen and lack the capacity to generate the consciousness that would take them as an object. Therefore, the paramāṇu posited in this way is definitely not truly existent. The reason for giving the cause “cannot be seen” is that it cannot establish the paramāṇu as truly existent. Why? Because entities with spatial parts exhibit distinct differences. Just as we can plainly see with pots, garments, and other objects—they can be differentiated by directions such as east, west, and north, and all of them have perceptible parts. If one claims that the paramāṇu is something presently existent, it must necessarily have spatial parts, due to its differentiated nature. In that case, one would have to concede that it has east, west, north, and other directional parts, and a truly existent paramāṇu could not be logically established. Nor can it be a single entity, for it is composed of multiple parts and its components are observed to be distinct. A single truly existent paramāṇu is definitely unobtainable. Thus one should abandon the doctrine of the paramāṇu. Therefore, the wise, understanding that the three realms are entirely the fabrications of deluded imagination, should not cling to them as real when seeking the sublime truth.

The first verse tells of seeing what looks like a snake in a dim, distant spot—only to find on closer look that it is just a length of rope, and on still closer inspection that its true nature is nothing more than strands of hemp. The second verse extends this to all worldly things. A pot or a garment, for instance, is no different from that distant snake: its essential nature is just clay or thread. Out of attachment to their own needs, people use deluded minds to falsely assign names to things, one after another. Still, from the perspective of conventional truth, one absolutely cannot claim that pots, garments, and similar things do not exist; from the perspective of ultimate truth, however, one cannot say they truly exist either.

The third verse goes further: it takes the hemp that makes up the rope, the clay that forms the pot, and the thread that weaves the garment, and keeps dividing them smaller and smaller, until they can be divided no more. At that point we reach the paramāṇu, or ultimate atom. The term “partless” (wú fēn) in the verse means there is no possibility of further division. In the Viṃśikā (Twenty Verses), “part” (fēn) refers to spatial directions—east, west, south, north, and so on—so “partless” means having no spatial direction. What has no spatial direction? Only something reduced to the scale of the paramāṇu. “Cannot be seen” (fēi jiàn) means imperceptible, whether by sight, hearing, touch, or cognition. “Reduced to the utmost” (zhì jí) in the second line refers to analysis that has reached the state of the paramāṇu.

The commentary opens with, “If someone again insists…” This is the position of an opponent: that things like rope, pots, and garments can be broken down into ever-smaller parts, and precisely because they are divisible, they are not truly real, only conventionally designated. This much holds. But the opponent goes further: if we divide without end, analyzing all the way to the point where no further division is possible, divisibility ceases entirely, and at that point we arrive at the paramāṇu. Since it cannot be divided any further, it must be truly existent. Master Dignāga holds that this reasoning is unsound. In fact, Bodhisattva Vasubandhu already refuted the paramāṇu in the Viṃśikā; Master Dignāga is taking up the argument again here, which itself shows how deeply rooted this misconception is. Let’s now turn to Master Dignāga’s refutation.

Master Dignāga’s refutation proceeds along two lines. The first focuses on imperceptibility.

Master Dignāga was a preeminent master of Hetuvidyā, or Buddhist logic, so we can frame his refutation using the three-membered syllogism standard to that tradition. Here is his commentary laid out in that form:

Proposition: The posited paramāṇu is necessarily imperceptible. Reason: Because it has no spatial parts. Homogeneous Example: That which has no spatial parts is necessarily imperceptible, like turtle hair, hare’s horns, and sky-flowers. Heterogeneous Example: That which is perceptible necessarily does not lack spatial parts, like pots and garments.

This is a complete three-membered syllogism. The qualifier “posited” (suǒzhí) is added to mark that the paramāṇu is the opponent’s claim: Hetuvidyā syllogisms require that the terms in the thesis be agreed upon by both sides, and the paramāṇu is exactly what Master Dignāga rejects. As Bodhisattva Vasubandhu explicitly states in the Viṃśikā, “The paramāṇu cannot be established.” Master Dignāga, as Vasubandhu’s disciple, inherited this teaching and likewise does not accept the paramāṇu—hence the qualifying term “posited” is included. “Imperceptible” here means it cannot be known through the direct perception of the five sense consciousnesses.

There is another syllogism:

Proposition: The posited paramāṇu definitely lacks the power to generate the consciousness apprehending it. Reason: Because it is imperceptible. Homogeneous Example: That which is imperceptible definitely lacks the power to generate the consciousness apprehending it, like turtle hair, hare’s horns, and sky-flowers.

This syllogism does not include a heterogeneous example, but in Hetuvidyā rules, the heterogeneous example only serves to guard against overgeneralization. Its absence is not ideal, but it does not count as a formal fallacy.

The predicate of this thesis—“lacks the power to generate the consciousness that apprehends it”—works as follows: for the five sense consciousnesses to arise in active manifestation, they require an object condition (ālambana-pratyaya). Without it, the four required conditions are incomplete, and manifestation cannot happen at all. Since the paramāṇu cannot be seen, heard, smelled, tasted, or touched, it’s disqualified from serving as an object condition. With one of the four conditions missing, only three remain—and three conditions are not enough to bring consciousness into manifestation! This is exactly what is meant by “lacks the power to generate the consciousness apprehending it.” Put simply: the paramāṇu cannot cause the five sense consciousnesses to arise, because it is imperceptible—just like turtle hair, hare’s horns, or sky-flowers.