Professor Lin Chong'an: No-Self and Emptiness, Lecture 4: Refuting Real Existence and Intrinsic Existence

No-Self and Emptiness, Lecture 4

Refuting Real Existence and Intrinsic Existence

Lin Chong'an (2007)

I. The Svatantrika School's Illusion Analogy

The Commentary to "Entering the Middle Way" That Clearly Reveals the Hidden Intent says: "To know what it means for something to exist 'through the contribution of the mind' or 'not through the contribution of the mind,' the analogy of an illusion makes it easy to understand. Just as an illusionist transforms wood and stone into elephants and horses, three people are involved: (a) the illusionist, (b) an observer whose eye consciousness is deluded, and (c) an observer whose eye consciousness is not deluded. (a) The first—the illusionist—merely sees elephants and horses without taking them to be elephants and horses. (b) The second, whose eye consciousness is deluded, both sees and takes them as such. (c) The third, whose eye consciousness is not deluded, neither perceives nor takes them to be elephants and horses."

It also says: "Just as the deluded observer sees inner and outer phenomena as 'truly existent'—not as something appearing in the mind or established through the contribution of the mind, but as existing in the very basis of phenomena themselves—to apprehend in this way is the 'innate apprehension of true existence,' transmitted since beginningless time... What is not established through appearing in the mind or through the contribution of the mind, but exists in the basis of the thing itself, is precisely real existence, ultimate existence, genuine existence. To grasp it as such is the innate apprehension of true existence."

The Hidden Intent Commentary critiques: "From the Prasangika vantage point, what the Svatantrika school posits still falls short—the very mind their grasping aims to refute has not yet reached the 'most subtle innate apprehension of true existence.'"

(1) Here we meet the Svatantrika school's terms: "established through the contribution of the mind," "real existence," and "innate apprehension of true existence."

(2) "When fundamental non-conceptual wisdom arises, all dualistic appearances are extinguished for that consciousness, just as the observer whose eye consciousness is not deluded has neither perception nor apprehension of any illusory form." This points to (c) the third person above, who has neither perception nor apprehension.

(3) Because the Svatantrika school holds that all phenomena exist from their own side, its "innate apprehension of true existence" does not reach the "most subtle" level. It can be placed within the Prasangika school's "coarse apprehension of the self of phenomena."

Explanations:

(1) A comparison before and after Zen realization:

(a) Before awakening, seeing a mountain as a mountain: (b) Seeing a mountain as not a mountain: form is emptiness. (c) After awakening, seeing a mountain as a mountain again: emptiness is form; form is not different from emptiness, emptiness is not different from form.

(a) corresponds to the second person above, the one whose eye consciousness is deluded. (b) corresponds to the third, whose eye consciousness is not deluded. (c) corresponds to the first, the illusionist.

(2) How should we understand "established through the contribution of the mind" and "not truly existent"?

The illusionist, seeing the elephants and horses, knows they arise through the contribution of the mind, knows they are not truly existent, and does not take them to be truly existent. Similarly, after awakening, when the realized person sees a mountain as a mountain again, the mountain is understood as established through the contribution of the mind and is no longer taken to be truly existent.

II. The Prasangika School's Rope-Snake Analogy

The Hidden Intent Commentary says: "Just as a snake is imposed upon a rope, when its mottled, coiled shape resembles a snake and the object is unclear, the thought 'this is a snake' arises. At that moment, neither the rope as a whole nor any part of it contains even the slightest basis for being a snake; the snake is 'established solely through conceptual designation.'"

Explanations:

(1) "When the object is unclear" signals that observation itself introduces some interference with what is being observed, so a purely objective result is impossible. Through this interference, the rope appears as a snake. The point of the analogy is not simply "illusion" but rather that observation interferes with the object.

(2) "Established solely through conceptual designation" means that, through the discriminating mind, we abstract qualities and definitions from what we observe. Once abstracted, these already limit the object's qualities and definitions—and inevitably differ in subtle ways from the thing itself. The object therefore cannot have intrinsic existence or self-character. Because qualities and definitions constrain, the object can never fully match itself, and the attempt to pin down its true face becomes a kind of interference. For instance, if you decide a person's personality is such-and-such, that very determination, through the act of observing, has already interfered with their actual personality. Whatever personality you conclude can never fully match the reality.

III. Illustration through the Scientific Color-Disk Analogy

To illustrate, let's use a spinning tri-color disk. When a disk of three colors—red, green, and blue—spins rapidly, it appears white. Different Buddhist schools explain this phenomenon at different levels:

(1a) Some hold that the red, green, and blue in the stationary disk each have their own material substance, each their own true substance, and that the white appearing in the spinning disk is likewise "truly substantially existent." Example: the Vātsīputrīya school's clinging to "substantial existence."

(1b) Others hold that the red, green, and blue in the stationary disk each have their own material substance, each their own true substance, but the white appearing in the spinning disk is not "truly substantially existent"—it is "merely existent," and what is merely existent must depend upon what is truly existent. Example: the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Cittamātra, and Svatantrika schools do not cling to "substantial existence" for the white disk. When a white disk is posited on the colored disk, the white disk is empty of true substantial existence. When a person is posited on body and mind, the person is empty of self-established true substantial existence—no-self of the person.

Explanations:

A coarse view of dependent origination: one knows only that the white of the white disk arises from the spinning of the colored disk, and does not yet know that the white is produced by persistence of vision.

(1c) Some hold that the white disk is not "truly substantially existent" but merely existent; by the same reasoning, the red, green, and blue of the colored disk are also merely existent, not truly substantially existent. What is merely existent depends upon what is merely existent. Example: the Prasangika school does not cling to "substantial existence." When a white disk is posited on the colored disk, the white disk is empty of true substantial existence. When a person is posited on body and mind, the person is empty of self-established true substantial existence—the Prasangika school's coarse no-self of the person.

(1d) Some hold that the apprehended white disk and the apprehending mind are of one and the same substance: there is no white disk outside the mind, and likewise no colored disk outside the mind. Example: the Cittamātra school does not cling to "objects outside the mind"; this is the "emptiness of the two apprehensions." When a white disk is posited on the colored disk, the white disk and the apprehending mind are of one and the same substance; there is no white disk outside the mind—emptiness of the apprehended white disk and the apprehending mind, emptiness of the two apprehensions.

(2a) Some hold that the white disk is truly existent and the colored disk is truly existent, believing the observed phenomenon is independent of the observer (not established through the contribution of the mind, not conceptually designated). They hold that white does not arise from the observer's persistence of vision but is the inherent nature of the colored disk itself once it spins. Example: the Vātsīputrīya, Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, and Cittamātra schools all cling to "real existence."

(2b) Some hold that the white disk is not truly existent. They maintain that observation does not affect the object on its side—the colored disk itself—but the "white disk" observed is entirely a matter of the observer's side, arising wholly from persistence of vision. This is called "established through the contribution of the mind." By the same reasoning, the various colors making up the colored disk are also not truly existent: each can be further decomposed and is likewise "established through the contribution of the mind." Example: the Svatantrika and Prasangika schools do not cling to "real existence."

○ Phenomena (e.g., the white disk) are established through the contribution of the mind and therefore are not truly existent—the Svatantrika school's subtle no-self of phenomena, the Prasangika school's coarse no-self of phenomena.

Explanations:

A subtle view of dependent origination: one knows that the white of the white disk arises from the spinning of the colored disk, and also knows it is produced by persistence of vision, but does not yet realize that during observation the white disk is itself affected by the act of observing and is therefore not purely objective.

(3a) Some hold that the "white disk itself" is unaffected by the observer, has the nature of existing from its own side, is a purely objective object, and is "intrinsically existent." By the same reasoning, the "colored disk itself" also exists from its own side and is intrinsically existent. Example: the Vātsīputrīya, Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Cittamātra, and Svatantrika schools all cling to "intrinsic existence."

(3b) Some hold that the "white disk itself" must inevitably be altered by the act of observation, however slightly, that it has no purely objective existence, no nature of existing from its own side, that it is "established solely through conceptual designation," and is "empty of intrinsic existence." By the same reasoning, the "colored disk itself" does not exist from its own side and is empty of intrinsic existence. Example: the Prasangika school does not cling to "intrinsic existence."

Explanations:

How should we understand "established solely through conceptual designation" and "not intrinsically existent"? Upon directly realizing the truth, one knows that the white disk and all things must inevitably be altered by observation, however slightly, and that there is no purely objective existence. The white disk and all things we ordinarily perceive are therefore both "established solely through conceptual designation" and "not intrinsically existent."

○ When a white disk is posited on the colored disk, the white disk is established solely through conceptual designation = does not exist from its own side = is empty of intrinsic existence = is not purely objective—the Prasangika school's subtle no-self of phenomena.

○ When a person is posited on body and mind, the person is established solely through conceptual designation = does not exist from its own side = is empty of intrinsic existence = is not purely objective—the Prasangika school's subtle no-self of the person.

○ All phenomena are established solely through conceptual designation—the Prasangika school's subtle no-self of phenomena.

Explanations:

The most subtle view of dependent origination: one knows that the white of the white disk arises from the spinning of the colored disk, also knows it is produced by persistence of vision, and also knows that during observation the white disk is affected by the act of observing and is therefore not purely objective.

IV. Verification

Whether phenomena "exist from their