Professor Lin Chong'an: No-Self and Emptiness, Lecture 2: Refuting the Self Identical to the Aggregates

No-Self and Emptiness, Lecture 2

Refuting the Self Identical to the Aggregates

Lin Chong'an (2007)

Explanation of "the Self Identical to the Aggregates"

Because there is no self that exists apart from the aggregates, the only object of self-view is the aggregates themselves. Some hold that self-view takes the five aggregates as its basis; others hold that it takes only the mind as its basis.

(1) The Vatsiputriya School holds that the object of self-view is only the "aggregates", and self-grasping arises from the five aggregates, so they assert "the five aggregates are the self", citing the Buddha's teaching in the Āgama Sūtras:

"All ascetics and brahmins who cling to the idea of 'I' and hold views aligned with it: every one of those views is nothing other than these five aggregates of clinging."

(2) A sub-sect within the Vatsiputriya School asserts "the mind is the self", also citing the Āgama Sūtras:

"I am my own refuge; who else could be my refuge? By taming the self well, the wise are born in heaven." and "One should tame the mind well; a tamed mind brings ease."

Refuting "the Self Identical to the Aggregates"

If you assert that the five aggregates are the self, then because there are many aggregates, a single person would have to have many selves. What’s more, that self would have to be a concrete, inherent entity—which would mean the object of self-view is not a delusion at all.

(1) If the five aggregates are the self, then because there are multiple aggregates, one person would have to contain many selves. (2) If you claim the mind is the self, consider the distinctions between eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, and the rest, or the distinctions between each successive instant of consciousness as it arises and ceases. Since there are many distinct moments of consciousness, the self would have to be many as well.

At the time of parinirvāṇa, the self would be completely severed. And before parinirvāṇa, all successive instants of the aggregates arise and cease without any inherent agent, so they cannot produce results; only actions created by others bear fruit. We have already examined and explained the flaw in the view of a concrete, continuous self earlier. For these reasons, neither the aggregates nor the mind are the self. The Buddha did not answer questions such as whether the world is finite, as these are indeterminate queries.

(3) If the aggregates are the self, then at the time of parinirvāṇa with no remaining aggregates, the five aggregates cease, so the self would cease completely as well. If this were true, the Buddha would have taught that "the world is finite" and that "the Tathāgata does not exist after death"—but he did not answer these questions.

(4) Since the five aggregates arise and cease moment by moment, the self would have to arise and cease moment by moment with entirely distinct inherent natures. The Buddha would never have said in the sūtras: "At that time I was King Maṇḍhātṛ"—because the body of that former self had already ceased, and does not exist now; and if that former self no longer exists, a separate self with a completely different inherent nature would have to exist to receive this present life.

(5) If each successive moment has a completely distinct inherent nature, then the self would have no connection to karmic results at all. [Objection:] If you claim that when a yogin directly perceives no-self, they are perceiving that all phenomena do not exist, [Reply:] If you say this is because they are seeing the absence of a permanent self, then your own mind and aggregates cannot be the self.

If you claim the Buddha taught the aggregates are the self, and so we should accept the aggregates as the self, we reply: The Buddha only used the phrase "these five aggregates of clinging" to refute the view of a self that exists apart from the aggregates. Other sūtras clearly state that form is not the self, that feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness are not the self, and that consciousness too is not the self—so he was not asserting that the aggregates are the self.

(6) When a yogin directly sees no-self, they see that there are no "aggregates and so on," and this is what we call seeing no-self. But if this were true, then when a yogin directly sees no-self, they would fail to realize the true nature of form and the other aggregates; they would still operate with reified grasping toward form and the rest, and give rise to afflictions such as craving.

○ That said, when Madhyamaka masters realize no-self, they also do not see "the five aggregates or the mind"—but they still take "true reality" as the object of their realization.

Reply: As other sūtras state: "Form is not the self, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness are also not the self. Consciousness too is not the self." Madhyamaka masters hold that the object of self-grasping is the idea of a "self." To "see only the aggregates" means to apprehend the self that is conventionally designated in dependence on the aggregates.

The Vatsiputriya master asks: How do we know this passage is refuting a self that exists apart from the aggregates, rather than teaching that the aggregates themselves are the self? Reply: As other sūtras state: "Form is not the self, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness are also not the self."

If you claim the self exists only as material form, then you should only say material form is the self. The collection of mind, mental factors, and the rest that you posit cannot be the self, because these mind and mental factors have no shape at all.

(7) The Vatsiputriya master says: Just as a pile of wheels and other cart parts is not yet a cart—only when those parts are arranged into the specific shape of a cart do we call it a cart—so too, it is the specific shape of the aggregates such as form in a living being’s body that is the self. Reply: Shape is a quality that only material phenomena possess. You Vatsiputriya masters should therefore only say material form is the self. The collection of mind, mental factors, and the rest that you posit cannot be the self, because these mind and mental factors have no shape at all.

The sūtra states: "There is no inherent agent, but there is action and its result." This passage refutes an inherently existent agent, not the conventionally designated self that is a composite of nominal parts. The Buddha taught that the self is conventionally designated in dependence on the six great elements: earth, water, fire, wind, consciousness, and space; and also in dependence on the six sense bases such as the eye. This means the self is not identical to these elements or sense bases. He also taught that the self is designated in dependence on mind and mental factors, so these are not the self itself, their collection is not the self either, and thus they are not the object of self-grasping.

○ Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka masters hold that the "self" is designated in dependence on the collection of aggregates, so it has no inherent substantial existence and is merely a conventional label. This view is based on this teaching from the Āgama Sūtras: "There are five dharmas that are nothing but names, nothing but words, nothing but conventional designations: the past, the future, space, nirvāṇa, and persons."

○ Whether we consider the five aggregates as a whole, one by one, or as separate from the aggregates entirely, none of them are the object of self-view. The actual object of self-view is "the person." Following this logic, when a yogin sees that the "self" is inherently non-existent, and also understands that "what belongs to the self" is inherently non-existent, they can cut through all the fetters of conditioned existence, will not take rebirth again, and attain nirvāṇa.

○ The Vatsiputriya school did not understand that "the self and persons are only conventionally designated based on linguistic convention." They hold that one must find a substantive basis for imputation in order to establish a self, and so they assert that "the five aggregates or the mind" are the self, making it an "inherently existent self." Prāsaṅgika masters, by contrast, hold that the self is "only conventionally designated by nominal convention," and do not claim that "one must find a substantive basis for imputation to establish it"—so they do not fall into this error.

Practice

Through practices such as walking meditation, one cultivates samatha, or calm abiding. Through study, reflection, and similar practices, one cultivates the correct view of no-self, then practices vipaśyanā, or insight meditation, to refute "the self identical to the aggregates."