Professor Lin Chong'an: An Inquiry into the Refutation of the "Self Identical with the Aggregates" in the *Entering the Middle Way*

An Inquiry into the Refutation of the "Self Identical with the Aggregates" in the Entering the Middle Way — Lin Chong'an

I. Preface

Within Buddhism, the Vatsiputriya school comprised five sub-sects: the Vatsiputriya, Dharmottara, Bhadrayaniya, Sannagarika, and Sammitiya. A core tenet of this tradition is the doctrine of the "self identical with the aggregates." What follows draws on the bodhisattva Candrakirti's Entering the Middle Way, together with Master Tsongkhapa's Illumination of the Hidden Meaning of the Entering the Middle Way, to refute this view and offer a brief investigation.

II. The Claim of the "Self Identical with the Aggregates"

Since there is no self apart from the aggregates, The object of the view of self can only be the aggregates. Some hold that the view of self depends on the five aggregates; Others hold it depends on mind alone.

(1) The Vatsiputriyas reject the "self apart from the aggregates," since there is no self with a distinct intrinsic nature separate from the aggregates. They argue that the object of self-view (satkāyadṛṣṭi) must fall into one of two categories: a self apart from the aggregates, or a self identical with them. Since the former is untenable, the object of self-view can only be the aggregates themselves.

Inquiry: The Vatsiputriyas reason exclusively in terms of substantial existence, so they assume the self must be one of these two types. They overlook a third possibility: the "conventional self" dependently established on the aggregates. This is what Candrakirti means by "a self established in dependence on the aggregates"—one that denies any substantially existent self.

(2a) One faction within the Vatsiputriya school holds that the object of self-view is the five aggregates themselves, and that grasping at a self arises from these aggregates. They therefore claim that "the aggregates are the self," citing the Buddha's teaching in the Āgamas:

"Bhikkhus, know this! All ascetics and brahmins who think 'I am' and follow that perception—all of them perceive only these five aggregates of grasping."

(2b) Another Vatsiputriya faction claims that "mind alone is the self," also citing the Āgamas:

"I am my own refuge—who else could be my refuge? By taming the self well, the wise attain heaven."

and

"One should tame the mind well; a tamed mind brings happiness."

Explanation: These are the Vatsiputriyas' fundamental claims—that "the aggregates are the self" or "the mind is the self." Both fall under the category of the "self identical with the aggregates."

III. Refutation of the "Self Identical with the Aggregates"

If the five aggregates were the self, then since the aggregates are many, the self should be many. What's more, that self would have to be substantially real, and the self-view taking [the aggregates] as its object wouldn't be mistaken.

(1) The Vatsiputriyas hold that both the self and the five aggregates are truly existent, forming a single, undifferentiated, indivisible entity. Candrakirti counters this with the argument that either "the self would have to be many" or "the five aggregates would have to be one":

(A) If the five aggregates are the self, then since the aggregates are many, a single person should have many selves.

(B) If mind is the self, then given the differences among eye consciousness, ear consciousness, and so forth—or given the moment-to-moment arising and ceasing of distinct consciousnesses—the self would likewise be many.

(2a) "That self would also have to be substantially existent": form, feeling, and the other aggregates have distinct substantial natures differentiated by past, future, and so on. Only these distinct substances are called "aggregates." If the self is the aggregates, then the self would have to be substantially existent. Yet the Buddha taught that the self is merely conventionally existent, not substantially real, as stated in the Āgamas:

"Bhikkhus, know this! There are five things that are mere names, mere labels, merely conventionally established: past time, future time, space, nirvana, and pudgala (hereafter translated simply as 'person')."

(2b) "The self-view taking [the aggregates] as its object wouldn't be mistaken": a self-view apprehending the aggregates would be a consciousness engaging with something substantially real—and therefore not mistaken—just as a consciousness apprehending blue or yellow is not mistaken.

At parinirvana, the self would certainly be cut off. Before parinirvana, in each successive moment, since [the aggregates] arise and cease with no agent, there would be no fruition [of karma]. One person's actions would be experienced as results by another.

(1a) You Vatsiputriyas claim that "one's own aggregates are the self." At nirvana without remainder, since the five aggregates cease, the self would necessarily cease as well. This amounts to the extreme view of annihilationism—precisely the kind of extreme view you yourselves attribute to grasping at the self as either permanent or annihilated.

Inquiry: The Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka school holds that even after nirvana without remainder, there are still "uncontaminated five aggregates" that serve as the basis for designating a "self."

(1b) During every moment prior to parinirvana, just as the five aggregates arise and cease moment by moment, the self would have to arise and cease with its own distinct intrinsic nature in each moment. If that were so, the Buddha could not have recalled his past lives in the sūtras, saying, "At that time, I was King Māndhātṛ." After all, the self of that time, whose body has long since perished, no longer exists—and you Vatsiputriyas hold that apart from that former self, there is a separate self with a distinct intrinsic nature that receives this present life.

(2) If successive moments are distinct in intrinsic nature, there can be no self that acts as agent. Without a basis for action, action itself would not exist, and there would be no connection between the self and the fruits of action. One person's deeds would be experienced as results by someone else—leading to the absurd conclusions that actions are destroyed without effect, and that one receives the consequences of deeds never performed.

Inquiry: The Prāsaṅgika school holds that the self across two successive moments does not differ in intrinsic nature; it is merely a continuous conventional self.

Those who claim [the self] is a single continuum have no faults? This was already examined and its errors stated above. Therefore neither the aggregates nor the mind is the self. This is also because questions about the world [having an edge, etc.] are left unanswered.

(1a) The Vatsiputriya masters say: "Although successive moments differ, they form a single continuum, so there is no fault."

(1b) Reply: To claim that truly distinct substantial entities form a single continuum and therefore present no fault is unreasonable. The earlier verse already addressed this: "Just as with the dharmas of Maitreya and Jinmītra—because they are distinct, they do not form one continuum." It is untenable for dharmas with mutually distinct intrinsic natures to constitute a single continuum. Therefore the faults of receiving consequences for unperformed actions and of actions being nullified after being performed cannot be avoided.

(2a) Thus both claims—that "one's own aggregates are the self" and that "mind is the self"—are untenable.

(2b) "Questions about the world are left unanswered" refers to the fourteen unanswerable questions: 1. The world is finite; 2. The world is infinite; 3. Both; 4. Neither; 5. The world is eternal; 6. The world is non-eternal; 7. Both; 8. Neither; 9. The Tathāgata exists after death; 10. The Tathāgata does not exist after death; 11. Both; 12. Neither; 13. The body and the life principle are identical; 14. The body and the life principle are distinct. The Buddha regarded these fourteen positions as unfit to be affirmed or denied. Thus the claim that "the aggregates are the self" is untenable.

If "the world" refers to the aggregates, and our own school holds that the aggregates arise and cease, then the Buddha should have declared that "the world is impermanent." You Vatsiputriyas claim that after parinirvana all aggregates cease entirely; the Buddha should then have said that the world is finite and that the Tathāgata does not exist after death. Yet when asked whether the world has an edge and so on, the Buddha declined to answer. Therefore the claim that "the aggregates are the self" is untenable. Here, "life principle" is another name for the self, and asking about "the world" is also a question asked in relation to the self.

If your yogi sees no-self, at that point they must also see that no phenomena exist. If you say they only see the absence of a permanent self at that time, then your own mind and aggregates are not the self either.

(1) According to your Vatsiputriya position, when a yogi directly perceives no-self, this must mean seeing the nonexistence of the "aggregates and so forth"—since the five aggregates and the mind are the self. But this cannot be accepted; therefore the five aggregates are not the self.

Explanation: The Vatsiputriyas and others who claim the aggregates and mind as the self do so because they fail to understand that "the self, persons, and so on are merely designated by the power of conventional labels." They insist on finding some substantially real basis to ground this designation, and so they posit the "five aggregates or the mind" as the self, which becomes a "self established through intrinsic nature." Consequently, when they directly perceive no-self, they must see that this "self" is utterly nonexistent—leading to the absurd conclusion that they see "all things as nonexistent."

The Prāsaṅgika school holds that things are "established by mere nominal designation" and does not insist on finding some real basis for that designation. It therefore avoids this fault.

Inquiry: The Vatsiputriyas take the five aggregates or the mind as the self, so when they realize the absence of "the five aggregates or mind," they assume they have realized no-self. For the Prāsaṅgika school, realizing "no-self" also involves the absence of "the five aggregates or mind"—but there remains the realization of "true reality" as the object of that understanding.

(2) The Vatsiputriya masters say: In the context of karma and its fruits, there is no self apart from the five aggregates; the "self" we speak of refers only to the five aggregates. But when seeing no-self, what one sees is the absence of the "inner spiritual self" posited by non-Buddhists—one merely sees conditioned processes. This does not incur the fault of failing to see "the aggregates and other phenomena."

Reply: If seeing no "self" means seeing the absence of a "permanent spiritual self," then the "self" you Vatsiputriyas speak of elsewhere cannot be reinterpreted to mean something else. Therefore the "mind and aggregates" you posit are not the self.

According to your school, a yogi seeing no-self does not realize the true nature of form and so forth. Because they still generate desire and other afflictions toward form, not having realized its true nature.

(1) Furthermore, according to your Vatsiputriya position, when a yogi directly perceives no-self, they would not realize the true nature of form and the rest—because at that point they merely see the absence of the "permanent self" claimed by non-Buddhists.

(2) Since the yogi still operates with "grasping at true existence" taking form and so on as its object, they will continue to generate desire and other afflictions, because they have not realized the ultimate truth of the nature of form and the rest.

If you say that because the Buddha taught the aggregates are the self, you therefore accept them as such: He was only refuting a self apart from the aggregates— other sūtras state that form is not the self.

(1) The Vatsiputriya masters say: We take the sacred teachings as our authority; no analytical reasoning can override them. The sacred teachings state that "only the aggregates are the self," as the Buddha said: "Bhikkhus, know this! All ascetics and brahmins who think 'I am' and follow that perception—all of them perceive only these five aggregates of grasping." Here the aggregates are called the self; therefore we accept that "the aggregates are the self."

(2) Reply: That sūtra does not state that "the aggregates are the self." The Buddha's intention was to refute those who hold the view of a "self apart from the aggregates" by confirming "only these five aggregates of grasping." This was taught from the standpoint of conventional truth in order to counter non-Buddhist doctrines and to correctly present the conventional self.

Since other sūtras state that form is not the self, and feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness are likewise not the self, the earlier [passage] was clearly not accepting the aggregates as the self.

The Vatsiputriya masters ask: How do you know that [the earlier sūtra] was refuting a "self apart from the aggregates" rather than stating that the aggregates are the self?

Reply: Other sūtras state: "Form is not the self, feeling is not the self, perception is not the self, formations are not the self, and consciousness is also not the self." Therefore, the earlier sūtra's concise statement—"All who think 'I am' and follow that perception perceive only these five aggregates of grasping"—does not accept "the aggregates as the self." Rather, the word "only" is used to definitively refute those who hold a self apart from the aggregates.

Inquiry: The Prāsaṅgika school holds that between the object and the aspect of "innate self-grasping," whatever serves as the object must be the "self." Thus the earlier sūtra does not say that "the aggregates are the object of self-view." When the sūtra says "only see the aggregates," it is indicating that the [object] is the self dependently designated on the aggregates—since both a "self apart from the aggregates" and a "self identical with the aggregates" have already been refuted as possible objects of self-grasping. Whenever sūtras refute "form and so on as the self," it should be understood that those sūtras are refuting the object of self-view as intrinsically existent—for the sūtras stating "form and so on are not the self" are spoken from the standpoint of ultimate truth.

When sūtras say the five aggregates are the self, they refer to the collection of aggregates, not to individual aggregate entities.

(1) The Vatsiputriya masters say: When the sūtra says "only see these five aggregates," it means that the collection of aggregates as a whole is the self—not that each individual aggregate is the self. Just as when we say "many trees form a forest," we mean the collection of trees is a forest, not that each individual tree is a forest.

(2) Reply: If you accept that "the collection of aggregates is the self," consider that the sūtras also describe the self as "a refuge," "something to be tamed," and "a witness." According to your Vatsiputriya position, a mere collection of aggregates cannot be a refuge, cannot be tamed, and cannot serve as a witness—because a mere collection has no substantial existence. Therefore the collection of aggregates is not the self.

Inquiry: The Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka school holds that the self is dependently established on the collection of aggregates, and therefore lacks intrinsic existence—it is conventionally existent.

At that point, a pile of chariot parts should also be called a chariot, since the chariot and the self are equivalent in this regard. The sūtras say [the self] is established in dependence on the aggregates; therefore the mere collection of aggregates is not the self.

(1) You Vatsiputriyas claim that the collection of aggregates is the self. If so, a heap of chariot parts assembled in one place should also be called a chariot—a clearly absurd conclusion—because the chariot and the self are equivalent in how they relate to the collection of their parts.

(2) Moreover, a sūtra states:

"You have fallen into wrong views; all formations and collections are empty. You mistakenly cling to sentient beings as real, but the wise understand they do not exist. Just as, depending on a collection of parts, a chariot is conventionally designated, so too, depending on the aggregates, a sentient being is conventionally posited."

This sūtra states that "a sentient being is conventionally posited in dependence on the aggregates." Therefore the mere collection of aggregates is not identical to the self.

If you claim [the self] exists because of shape and form, then you should say only form is the self. The mind and other collections should not be the self, since they have no shape, not being form phenomena.

(1a) The Vatsiputriya masters say: A mere pile of wheels and so forth does not yet constitute a chariot. Only when the wheels and parts are assembled with the distinctive shape of a chariot is it called one. Likewise, it is the configuration or shape of form and the other aggregates in a sentient being's body that constitutes the self.

(1b) Reply: This too won't do. Shape belongs only to form phenomena. You Vatsiputriyas should therefore claim that only form is the self.

(2) The mind, mental factors, and related collections you Vatsiputriyas posit should not be the self, since they have no shape—they are not form phenomena.

The taker and the taken being one makes no sense; action and agent would also have to be one. If you say there is action without an agent—that won't work either, since apart from an agent there is no action.

(1) There is yet another fault. If the agent-self goes to take rebirth as the "taker," and what is taken—namely the five aggregates constituted through action—is called the "taken," then to say these two are one is unreasonable. Thus, establishing the collection of aggregates as the self makes no sense.

The Vatsiputriya masters say: The collection of aggregates such as form is the self; action and agent can be one.

Reply: This too is unacceptable, for if that were so, then the great elements and derived form, a pot and its potter, would all have to be one and the same.

(2) The Vatsiputriya masters say: In this case there is no agent at all who takes up the collection of aggregates; there is only the collection of aggregates as a taken object.

Reply: This is also incorrect. If there is no agent, there can be no action either—for there is no action without a cause.

Explanation: In general, all agents and objects of action—and in particular, all valid cognizers and their objects—are accepted as dependently existent, not intrinsically existent. Any sūtra on ultimate emptiness that states "there is no agent, but there are actions and their fruits" should be understood as refuting the agent as intrinsically existent, not the conventionally designated person.

The Buddha said: depending on the six elements— earth, water, fire, wind, consciousness, and space— and on the six sense bases from the eye to the mind, one conventionally designates "I." He said the self is established depending on mind and mental factors, so none of those is itself the self, nor is their collection. Therefore they are not the domain of self-grasping.

The Vatsiputriyas' claim that the collection of aggregates is the self has yet another fault. In the Sūtra of Father and Son Meeting, the Buddha said:

"Depending on the elements of earth, water, fire, and wind, the consciousness element, and the space element such as the nasal cavity, and on the six sense bases from the eye to the mind, 'I' is conventionally designated. And depending on mind, mental factors, and their supporting basis, the self is conventionally posited."

Thus neither any single element such as earth is the self, nor is their collection established as the self. Therefore all these dharmas, whether taken individually or as a totality, are not the object of the mind that has grasped at "I" since beginningless time.

Explanation: Since the aggregates are not the object of "innate self-grasping," and there is no object of self-grasping apart from the aggregates either, the "object of self-grasping" is not intrinsically existent. Therefore, when yogis see that the "self" is empty of intrinsic existence, they also understand that "what is mine" is empty of intrinsic existence. Through this, they sever all bondage to saṃsāra and, no longer subject to rebirth, attain nirvana.

Thus the five aggregates—whether individually or collectively—along with anything apart from the aggregates, cannot be established as the object of self-view. Yet the object of self-view is correctly established as the "person." On this basis, the person can be established as empty of intrinsic existence.

Realizing no-self cuts off the permanent self, but I don't accept that this permanent self is the basis of innate self-grasping. So saying that knowing the impermanent self cuts off self-grasping—how astonishing!

You Vatsiputriyas claim that when directly realizing the absence of self, one merely severs the "permanent self." But I do not accept that this permanent self is the basis—whether as object or aspect—of "innate self-grasping." So when you say that "merely seeing the absence of this permanent self and cultivating that wisdom can permanently eradicate the self-grasping that has continued since beginningless time"—what an astonishing claim!

Seeing a snake dwelling in the wall of one's own room, one says "there is no elephant here" to dispel the fear. If this could also remove the fear of the snake— how ridiculous! Others would surely laugh.

You Vatsiputriyas claim that merely seeing the absence of a "permanent self" can eradicate the self-grasping that has persisted since beginningless time. Let us use an everyday analogy to show how unrelated these two things are.

A foolish person saw a snake living in the wall of their room and was terrified. Someone told them, "Don't be afraid—there is no elephant in this room." If one were to claim that knowing there is no elephant not only removes the fear of elephants but also the fear of snakes—how absurd! The wise would surely laugh.

IV. Conclusion

Through careful and thorough study of the sūtras and treatises, Master Tsongkhapa clarified the deepest intended meaning of all the Buddhas, along with the unique and profound tenets of Nāgārjuna and the master Candrakirti. He brought to light, through faultless reasoning, what earlier scholars of other schools had failed to articulate: he refuted the notion that either "a self apart from the aggregates" or "the aggregates themselves" serves as the object of self-view, and pointed out that the object of self-view is simply the "person"—merely designated in dependence on the aggregates, through the power of conventional labels. The aspect of self-view is the person apprehended as intrinsically existent. The absence of self in persons is precisely the negation of the person's intrinsic existence. This way of establishing the absence of self in persons is identical to how one establishes the absence of intrinsic existence in phenomena—a uniquely profound insight of the Prāsaṅgika school.