An Inquiry into the Madhyamakāvatāra's Refutation of the "Substantially Existent Self"

Lin Chong'an

I. Preface

From childhood into adulthood, most of us carry a quiet, persistent sense of a self that is self-standing and self-sufficient. Even as our bodies change and our views shift, this "I" feels unchanging. We experience it as neither identical to the body and mind, nor as something that exists separately from them. This sense of self is sometimes called the self neither identical to nor separate from the aggregates, and also referred to as the inexpressible self. The Vātsīputrīyas hold that this inexpressible self is real. They argue that the material constituents of a vase or pillar are either atoms or the four great elements—earth, water, fire, and air—and that these atoms and elements are substantially existent. By the same logic, the self-standing "I" we carry with us from childhood into adulthood is also substantially existent; they call it the "self-standing, substantially existent self." The Vātsīputrīyas hold that every sentient being possesses this self, while all other Buddhist schools reject the existence of such an entity.

Drawing on the Madhyamakāvatāra and its commentary, the Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya (Clarifying the Intent), this inquiry uses the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika perspective to refute the Vātsīputrīyas' notions of the inexpressible self and the substantially existent self.

II. The Vātsīputrīyas' Substantially Existent Self

The verse says:

"Some hold an inexpressible self to be a real existent, neither one with nor different from the aggregates, neither permanent nor impermanent; moreover, it is the object of the six consciousnesses and is the referent of self-grasping."

The "substantially existent self" maintained by the Vātsīputrīyas:

(1) The self (pudgala) is not distinct in nature from the aggregates, since no self exists apart from them; yet it is not the intrinsic nature of the aggregates either, for if it were, the self would be subject to birth and cessation. For this reason, neither the oneness nor the difference of the self and the five aggregates can be affirmed. (2) By the same reasoning, the self (pudgala) cannot be affirmed as either permanent or impermanent. (3) The self is substantially existent: it is the agent that acts on the two types of karma, the experiencer that receives the two types of fruit (suffering and happiness), the one bound by saṃsāra, and the one who attains liberation in nirvāṇa. (4) This self is the "object known" of the six consciousnesses. (5) This self is the "referent" of self-grasping.

Explanation:

If the self and the aggregates were one and the same, then transplanting an organ from my body to another person would mean that a "self" now resides in that other person's body. If the self and the aggregates were one and the same, then when I shift from unwholesome to virtuous conduct, or from ordinary being to realized state, my mental states before and after would be completely different, and I would count as two entirely separate people. But in conventional terms, people still take the earlier and later versions of me as one person. For this reason, the self and the aggregates cannot be one and the same. On the other hand, no self exists apart from the aggregates. Some Vātsīputrīyas therefore argue that the self is the "inexpressible self" that is neither identical to nor separate from the aggregates; they hold this self is substantially existent, as it is the agent of both unwholesome and wholesome karma, the experiencer of suffering and happiness, the one who cycles through saṃsāra, and the one who attains liberation in nirvāṇa.

Q: Is the self identical with the aggregates?
Vātsīputrīya: Inexpressible.

Q: Is the self different from the aggregates?
Vātsīputrīya: Inexpressible.

Q: Should the self be an object known by the six consciousnesses?
Vātsīputrīya: Agreed.

Q: The self should be an object of knowledge, because it is the object known by the six consciousnesses?
Vātsīputrīya: Agreed.

Q: The self should be either permanent or impermanent, because it is an object of knowledge?
Vātsīputrīya: Agreed.

Q: Is the self permanent?
Vātsīputrīya: Inexpressible.

Q: Is the self impermanent?
Vātsīputrīya: Inexpressible.

III. The Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika Refutation of the Substantially Existent Self

The verse says:

"If you do not allow that mind and form are inexpressible as one or different, [then] substantially existent things are never inexpressible. If you assert that I am substantially existent, then, like the mind, I should not be inexpressible."

(1) It's unreasonable to hold that the self (pudgala) is substantially existent. Just as no one would accept that mind and form are "inexpressible as either one or different in nature," substantially existent phenomena—being truly established—cannot be described as "inexpressible with respect to oneness or difference." If the self were substantially existent, it would be like the mind (a genuinely existing entity): it could not be inexpressible under either of these two alternatives. (2) This verse already shows that anything described as "inexpressible" can't be substantially existent.

Explanation:

Mind and form must be either one in nature or different in nature, since they exist as real entities. If the self were substantially existent, it and the aggregates would likewise have to be either one in nature or different in nature. Since mind and form are substantially existent, they must be either one or different—they cannot be called "inexpressible." If the self and aggregates were substantially existent, the same would apply: they would have to be either one or different. Yet the Vātsīputrīyas simultaneously hold that "the self and aggregates are substantially existent" and that "the self is inexpressible." This is inconsistent: if the self were substantially existent, it would have to be either identical to or different from the substantially existent aggregates, and it would be possible to give a definite answer to which—not to say it is "inexpressible." From this we can infer that the self is not substantially existent, but merely imputed.

The verse says:

"Just as you say that a vase is not a real entity, and thus [its relationship] with its component colors and so forth is inexpressible as one or different, [so] the self and the aggregates being inexpressible, the self should not be asserted to exist by way of its own nature."

(1) Just as you acknowledge that a vase is not a self-standing real entity, and agree that its relationship to its component parts (such as color) is inexpressible as either one or different in nature, so too the self and the aggregates are an imputed existence for which oneness or difference cannot be asserted. For this reason, one should not hold that the self (pudgala) exists by way of its own intrinsic nature. (2) These two verses have refuted the claim that the self (pudgala) is substantially existent, and established that it is merely imputed.

Explanation:

Since the Vātsīputrīyas agree that "a vase and its component parts are inexpressible as one or different in nature; therefore a vase is not a self-standing real entity," we can use this same line of reasoning to refute the claim that "the self is substantially existent": "The self and the aggregates are inexpressible as one or different in nature; therefore I am not a self-standing, substantially existent self." This style of refutation is called an "equal-in-kind refutation" (or refutation by parallel analogy).

The verse says:

"Your consciousness, you do not allow to be different from itself, yet you allow it to be different from form and the like. Real entities are seen to have only these two aspects. Apart from real entities, therefore, the self does not exist."

(1) Oneness and difference are the only ways real entities can be apprehended, but the self does not fit either category; therefore it is not substantially existent. If you assert that the "self" is substantially existent, then just as you hold that consciousness cannot be different in nature from itself, the self (pudgala) must also not be distinct from its own intrinsic nature, and so must be one with it. In the same way, just as you accept that consciousness and form are distinct phenomena, the self (pudgala) must also be distinct from the aggregates. (2) All real entities are invariably observed to have only these two aspects: oneness or difference. Therefore, the self is not substantially existent, because it does not fall under either of these two categories that apply to real entities.

Explanation:

If the self were substantially existent, it would have to be both one in nature with the aggregates (by the analogy of consciousness) and different in nature from them (by the analogy of consciousness and form)—a contradiction. From this we can infer that the self is not substantially existent.

IV. The Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika Establishment of Imputed Existence

Why do some people propose that "the person is substantially existent"? The Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya explains:

For beings who need to be taught that the person (pudgala) is substantially existent in order to be guided and settled, the teaching speaks of the person (pudgala) as substantially existent to lead them in.

This is based on a passage from the Āgamas:

Monks! The five aggregates are the burden; the bearer of the heavy burden is called the pudgala.

Though this sūtra passage does not explicitly state that the person is substantially existent, its meaning conveys this, to address those who cling to the view that "the person is a self-standing, substantially existent self." It speaks of a "pudgala capable of bearing the heavy burden" to lead such practitioners in. The Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas uphold the principle of "the imputed rests upon the imputed." This means that the "basis of designation" for all imputedly existent phenomena is itself only imputedly existent. The Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya says:

Question: With respect to a vase and the like, the "basis of designation" consisting of the "four great elements" and the "things produced from the four great elements" have substantial existence; therefore, for the designation "vase" and the like, it is reasonable to have a cause or basis of designation that is substantially existent. You Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas say that all phenomena are merely designated, yet if the basis of designation is not substantially existent, then [the result] should be like a stone's offspring.

(Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika) Reply: This reasoning is flawed, for there is no basis for claiming that "the basis of designation must be substantially existent." Consider these analogies: a merely designated "reflection" appears through the gathering of imputedly existent "features and so forth"; a "house" is designated through imputedly existent "pillars and similar parts"; likewise, a "forest" is designated through [imputedly existent] "trees and similar elements." Just as a dream can produce a "sprout unproduced by way of its own nature" from a "seed unproduced by way of its own nature," it is entirely reasonable that the "basis of designation" for all imputedly existent phenomena is itself only imputedly existent.

This makes clear that the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika principle of "the imputed rests upon the imputed" is entirely distinct from the principles of other schools: "the substantial rests upon the substantial" and "the imputed rests upon the substantial."

V. Conclusion

"Substantially existent" (rdzas yod; dravyasat) and "imputedly existent" (btags yod; prajñaptisat) are mutually opposing positions. The principles of "the substantial rests upon the substantial," "the imputed rests upon the substantial," and "the imputed rests upon the imputed" are also core philosophical stances. The Madhyamakāvatāra rejects the view of "substantially existent" and instead upholds "the imputed rests upon the imputed"—the unique position of the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas. For the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas, to say "the person is imputedly existent" means that "the person is merely designated in dependence on the aggregates." Neither the person nor the aggregates exist inherently, from their own side; both are empty of self-nature.