Professor Lin Chong'an: An Explanation of the "Verse of Three 'Is'" on Dependent Origination

An Explanation of the "Verse of Three 'Is'" on Dependent Origination — Lin Chong'an

1. The Verse of Three "Is" and the Verse of Three "Thats"

The "Verse of Three 'Is'" from the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way) reads: "Things that arise from causes and conditions, I declare them to be empty; they are also conceptual designations; they are also the meaning of the middle way." Three "is" appear in this verse, hence its name. The Tibetan translation from the Sanskrit reads:

rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba gang / de ni stong pa nyid du shad / de ni brten nas gdags pa ste / de nyid dbu ma'i lam yin no //

Its Chinese rendering goes: "Whatever is a dependently originated dharma, that is declared to be empty; that is established upon dependence; its nature is the middle way." In the Tibetan (and Sanskrit), three instances of "that" (de/ta) appear, so the verse can also be called the "Verse of Three 'Thats'" (for "its nature" is simply "that-ness"). This renowned verse has been interpreted in many ways over the centuries; what follows unpacks its deeper meaning through everyday examples.

2. Explaining the Profound Meaning with Examples

(1) Things That Arise from Causes and Conditions

Take Mother Wang next door, who gives birth to a baby boy named Wang Yonggan ("Wang the Brave"). Wang Yonggan is a phenomenon that arises from causes and conditions: he was brought into being through his parents along with the appropriate causal conditions, and once born, he was given the name Wang Yonggan. He came into being through cause and effect. Today's technology can confirm this — we can even examine DNA to verify the causal link. It's something anyone can see. So Wang Yonggan is an existent fact — this is "conventional existence," which is what the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā calls "things that arise from causes and conditions."

(2) I Declare Them to Be Empty

Look more closely and you'll see that Wang Yonggan depended on his father, his mother, and many other causes and conditions just to enter this world. "Existence by self-nature" (svabhāva) would mean existing from one's own side, independent of others. From this we can infer that Wang Yonggan cannot exist by self-nature — he is empty of self-nature. If Father Wang and Mother Wang existed by self-nature, each would stand alone and couldn't produce a child. So Wang Yonggan was born from a father empty of self-nature and a mother empty of self-nature. This is what the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā means by "I declare them to be empty."

(3) They Are Also Conceptual Designations

Once Wang Yonggan was born, he was given his name. Perhaps his parents hoped he'd accomplish great things and not live an ordinary life, so they poured their hopes into the child and named him "Brave." This is the establishment of a conceptual designation. Without the baby boy, of course, no one would coin the name "Wang Yonggan." Whether the child actually grows up to be brave is beside the point, but when relatives and friends speak of "Wang Yonggan," they're clearly not pointing to an abstract name — they're pointing to this living, breathing little boy. In other words, Wang Yonggan is designated on the basis of Wang Yonggan's body and mind. This is what "established solely through conceptual imputation" means, and it's what the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā calls "they are also conceptual designations."

There's a further meaning to "established solely through conceptual imputation" here. In their interactions with Wang Yonggan, people observe him over time and form impressions of his personality, his temperament, and so on. What they arrive at is likewise "established solely through conceptual imputation," colored inevitably by their own subjectivity; it can't perfectly match the actual Wang Yonggan inside and out, so it's not truly existent. These interactions also shape the child himself, so his personality and the like don't exist from their own side — they aren't self-existent, don't possess self-characteristics. The same goes for people's impressions of Wang Yonggan's parents: those too are "established solely through conceptual imputation," neither truly existent nor self-existent, without self-characteristics. Extend this outward and every phenomenon we encounter is established solely through conceptual imputation, empty of self-nature.

(4) They Are Also the Meaning of the Middle Way

From the above, Wang Yonggan comes into being through cause and effect — his parents are the cause, Wang Yonggan is the fruit of this dependent origination. This is conventional existence, in keeping with worldly cause and effect: he was born from his parents. To deny this causal fact is to fall into the "annihilation view" (uccheda-dṛṣṭi). On the other hand, neither Wang Yonggan nor his parents exist by self-nature; both are empty of self-nature. To regard them as self-existent is to fall into the "eternalism view" (śāśvata-dṛṣṭi). To step free of both the annihilation view and the eternalism view is to abide in the "middle way" (madhyamā pratipad). By extension, from the insight that "all phenomena are established solely through conceptual imputation and are empty of self-nature," we can see that all phenomena are dependently established and conventionally existent; deny this and you fall into the annihilation view. On the other hand, all phenomena are empty of self-nature; regard them as self-existent and you fall into the eternalism view. Step free of both and you abide in the middle way. This is what the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā calls "they are also the meaning of the middle way."

3. Further Inquiry

Wang Yonggan and his parents are all "persons," so the emptiness of self-nature here refers to the emptiness of the person — that is, the selflessness of the person (pudgala-nairātmya). Why, then, do a father empty of self-nature and a mother empty of self-nature give birth to a son empty of self-nature rather than a daughter empty of self-nature? Because in this instance of dependent origination, the outcome was a boy; that's the fact of dependent origination at this moment. Given the present causal conditions, only a baby boy was born, and he was named Wang Yonggan — this is conventional existence. Parents empty of self-nature might, when conditions are right in the future, also bring forth a daughter empty of self-nature, who could be named Wang Meili ("Wang the Beautiful") and so on; but it's also possible the future conditions won't suffice and no daughter will ever appear. The point is that parents empty of self-nature can't produce just anything — they can't give birth to stones or automobiles. Parents empty of self-nature may not produce a child at all. To have a child, many conditions must be met, and the fact that conditions are required shows there's no independent, self-determining nature — and that's why they're empty of self-nature.

That Wang Yonggan is Mother Wang's child is established at the conventional level — this is the first level, the most basic, observable causal fact. Whether he's also empty of self-nature is a second-level question, and these two levels shouldn't be confused. The first level: Mother Wang gives birth to Wang Yonggan. The second level: Mother Wang, empty of self-nature, gives birth to Wang Yonggan, empty of self-nature. Wang Yonggan's birth is possible because he's empty of self-nature, but one can't argue, "Well, if he's empty of self-nature, why isn't a girl being born right now?" To forcibly call Wang Yonggan a girl would violate the first level of conventional existence and contradict ordinary consensus. At the "cause-stage," Father Wang empty of self-nature and Mother Wang empty of self-nature cannot guarantee that a Wang Yonggan will appear at the "effect-stage." In other words, just because things are empty of self-nature doesn't mean anything can come into being — birth depends on conditions, and those conditions are governed by dependent origination.

The first level is conventional existence: the phenomena everyone can see, the results that come from causes and conditions, upon which names and concepts are established. The second level — emptiness of self-nature — is the reality uncovered on the basis of the first-level phenomena, and this reality cannot, of course, be separated from the first level. Take a ball as an analogy. A ball (the matter/event) is the tangible object right before your eyes — that's a first-level fact. Newton, observing balls at the first level, discovered that between balls there is universal gravitation (the principle) — a second-level truth. Clearly, the second-level universal gravitation (principle) cannot be separated from the first-level balls (matter/events), and the first-level balls (matter/events) cannot be separated from the second-level universal gravitation (principle). By the same token, a ball cannot be separated from the ball's emptiness, and the ball's emptiness cannot be separated from the ball. We find emptiness through phenomena; emptiness cannot be separated from phenomena, and phenomena cannot be separated from emptiness. Likewise, Wang Yonggan and Wang Yonggan's emptiness of self-nature are inseparable. Extend this and you arrive at the profound principle: "Form is not different from emptiness, emptiness is not different from form."