Professor Lin Chong'an: A Brief Exploration of the Origins of Indian Hetuvidyā — An Investigation Based on the *Mahāvibhāṣā*

Selected Essays on Buddhist Studies

A Brief Exploration of the Origins of Indian Hetuvidyā — An Investigation Based on the Mahāvibhāṣā

Lin Chong'an

1. Introduction

Around 60 BCE, the Venerable Kātyāyanīputra composed the Jñānaprasthāna; around 100 CE, during the reign of King Kaniṣka, five hundred arhats elaborated the meaning of the Jñānaprasthāna and compiled the Mahāvibhāṣā. Volume 27 of this treatise mentions "refuting an opponent" in Hetuvidyā. Drawing on that record, we will trace the origins of Indian Hetuvidyā.

2. Three Types of Refutation

The Mahāvibhāṣā states:

In Hetuvidyā treatises, refuting an opponent is said to follow three paths: 1) refutation that suspends judgment, 2) refutation that exposes flaws, and 3) refutation that removes objections. The Buddha's Sūtras likewise set out three paths for refuting opponents: 1) refutation that overcomes the opponent, 2) refutation that parallels the opponent, and 3) refutation that contradicts the opponent's thesis. (T27, p139a)

This passage, aside from containing the term "Hetuvidyā," also shows that "Hetuvidyā treatises" and the "Buddha's Sūtras" belong to different systems and use different vocabulary for "refuting an opponent." Hetuvidyā scholars speak of suspending judgment, exposing flaws, and removing objections; Buddhist scholars speak of overcoming, paralleling, and contradicting an opponent's thesis. What do these mean? The Mahāvibhāṣā explains through three sūtra examples:

1. Refutation that overcomes the opponent: The brahmin Long-claw said to the Buddha: "I cannot accept any view at all." The Buddha replied: "Then do you not accept your own view either?" He conceded.

2. Refutation that parallels the opponent: The non-Buddhist ascetic Potali said to the Buddha: "Gautama, do you know magic? If you do not, you are not omniscient; if you do, you must be a magician who deludes others." The Buddha replied: "In the town of Kutā there is a scoundrel named Lampaka Cūḍa who breaks precepts and commits evil. Do you know him?" He answered: "I do." The Buddha said: "Then you must be a scoundrel of the same sort." He conceded.

3. Refutation that contradicts the opponent's thesis: The householder Upāli said to the Buddha: "Bodily misdeeds are the gravest, not mental ones." The Buddha replied: "Who created the forests of Takṣaśilā and Kaliṅga, and the like? Was it not the malicious intent of sages?" He answered: "Yes." The Buddha said: "Could bodily deeds have created them?" He said: "No." The Buddha said: "Are you not now contradicting your earlier claim?" He conceded.

These three sūtra examples illustrate the three kinds of refutation. In overcoming, the proponent's own claim cannot stand when turned back on themselves. In paralleling, a parallel case is raised; if the proponent accepts it, they fall into a corner. In contradicting, a case is cited such that accepting it would undercut the proponent's own position. All three show that the Buddha himself was adept at using dialectic to refute others, and that Buddhist logical methods were already at work in the sūtras. Around 155 BCE, the monk Nāgasena carried on this dialectical style, subdued King Milinda, and left the widely admired Milindapañha. Buddhist modes of reasoning, then, persisted; they were still in use during King Kaniṣka's reign. Below we draw on examples from the Mahāvibhāṣā to understand "refutation that parallels the opponent" more closely.

3. Refutation That Parallels the Opponent

The Jñānaprasthāna, Volume 1, states:

Should craving for non-existence be classified as severed by view or severed by cultivation? Answer: As severed by cultivation.

Buddhist sūtras divide craving into three: craving for sense pleasures, craving for existence, and craving for non-existence. Here the question is whether craving for non-existence falls under severing by view or under severing by cultivation. The Jñānaprasthāna is a foundational text of the Sarvāstivāda school; here it states its position first: "craving for non-existence is severed by cultivation," which it unpacks as: "craving for non-existence is exclusively severed by cultivation; stream-enterers have not yet abandoned this craving." Stream-enterers only abandon the fetters severed by view and have not yet abandoned any of the fetters severed by cultivation. The Vibhajyavādins, by contrast, hold that craving for non-existence falls under both severances. The Mahāvibhāṣā records a sharp debate: the Vibhajyavādins raise objections, and the Sarvāstivādins respond through "those who apply reasoning":

The Vibhajyavādins asked: "You say that craving for non-existence is exclusively severed by cultivation, and that stream-enterers have not yet abandoned it. Is that right?" Those who apply reasoning answered: "Yes." The Vibhajyavādins asked: "What do you think? Do stream-enterers ever entertain the thought: 'If I am utterly annihilated after death, would that not be blissful'?" Those who apply reasoning answered: "No." The Vibhajyavādins said: "Hear my argument. (1) If craving for non-existence is exclusively severed by cultivation, and stream-enterers have not yet abandoned it, then it must follow that stream-enterers do entertain the thought: 'If I am utterly annihilated after death, would that not be blissful?' (2) If stream-enterers do not entertain that thought: 'If I am utterly annihilated after death, would that not be blissful?', then it cannot be that craving for non-existence is exclusively severed by cultivation and stream-enterers have not yet abandoned it. Either way, your position is untenable."

Those who apply reasoning had put forward two claims: a. Thesis: Craving for non-existence is exclusively severed by cultivation. b. Meaning: Stream-enterers do not entertain the thought: "If I am utterly annihilated after death, would that not be blissful?"

The Vibhajyavādins now refute them by exposing the contradiction between a and b: (1) If craving for non-existence is exclusively severed by cultivation, then since stream-enterers have not abandoned it, they should arise the thought: "If I am utterly annihilated after death, would that not be blissful?" So if a holds, b fails — this is "consonant with the thesis, dissonant with its meaning." (2) If stream-enterers do not entertain that thought, then they have already abandoned craving for non-existence, which would make it a fetter severed by view. So if b holds, a fails — this is "consonant with the meaning, dissonant with the thesis."

Since (1) is consonant with the thesis but dissonant with its meaning, and (2) is consonant with the meaning but dissonant with the thesis, a and b cannot both stand. The Vibhajyavādins thus refute those who apply reasoning and put forward their own view: craving for non-existence falls under both severances.

Those who apply reasoning now turn the table with a "refutation that parallels the opponent." Although the Vibhajyavādins do not hold that "craving for non-existence is exclusively severed by cultivation, and stream-enterers have not yet abandoned it," they do hold the following: that "craving for the ripened result in hell, among animals, and in the ghost realm is exclusively severed by cultivation, and stream-enterers have not yet abandoned it"; that "the fetter by which, being bound, one kills one's parents is exclusively severed by cultivation, and stream-enterers have not yet abandoned it"; and that "the greed for the non-existence of what is severable by cultivation is exclusively severed by cultivation, and stream-enterers have not yet abandoned it." Relying on these very claims, those who apply reasoning deploy the "refutation that parallels the opponent":

Those who apply reasoning asked: "You also say that craving for the ripened result in hell, among animals, and in the ghost realm is exclusively severed by cultivation, and that stream-enterers have not yet abandoned it. Is that right?" The Vibhajyavādins answered: "Yes." Those who apply reasoning asked: "What do you think? Do stream-enterers ever entertain the thought: 'I will become the dragon king Elāpatra, the dragon king Suṣṭhita, or King Yama of the ghosts, and rule over all the beings of the ghost realm'?" The Vibhajyavādins answered: "No." Those who apply reasoning said: "Hear my argument. (1) If craving for the ripened result in hell, among animals, and in the ghost realm is exclusively severed by cultivation, and stream-enterers have not yet abandoned it, then it must follow that stream-enterers do entertain the thought: 'I will become the dragon king Elāpatra, the dragon king Suṣṭhita, or King Yama of the ghosts, and rule over all the beings of the ghost realm.' (2) If stream-enterers do not entertain that thought, then it cannot be that craving for the ripened result in hell, among animals, and in the ghost realm is exclusively severed by cultivation and stream-enterers have not yet abandoned it. Either way, your position is untenable."

The Vibhajyavādins' claim that "craving for the ripened result in hell, among animals, and in the ghost realm is exclusively severed by cultivation, and stream-enterers have not yet abandoned it" is, in effect, the same as the earlier claim that "craving for non-existence is exclusively severed by cultivation, and stream-enterers have not yet abandoned it."

Used in this negative way, "refutation that parallels the opponent" leaves the Vibhajyavādins caught in a dilemma. Those who apply reasoning then offer a positive resolution:

"Just as craving for the lower realms is present in the saints without arising, so too with craving for non-existence." (T27, p139c)

This means that although stream-enterers have not abandoned craving for the ripened result in hell, among animals, and in the ghost realm, the thought "I will become the dragon king Elāpatra, the dragon king Suṣṭhita, or King Yama of the ghosts, and rule over all the beings of the ghost realm" does not actually arise in them. Likewise, although stream-enterers have not abandoned craving for non-existence, the thought "If I am utterly annihilated after death, would that not be blissful?" does not actually arise. In other words, thesis a and meaning b are not really at odds: stream-enterers have not abandoned craving for non-existence — the seed remains — yet the corresponding thought does not come to the surface. Those who apply reasoning dissolve the apparent contradiction through this distinction: for craving for non-existence, the seed is uncut, but it does not surface.

The Mahāvibhāṣā goes on to invoke two more theses: "the fetter by which, being bound, one kills one's parents is exclusively severed by cultivation, and stream-enterers have not yet abandoned it," and "the greed for the non-existence of what is severable by cultivation is exclusively severed by cultivation, and stream-enterers have not yet abandoned it." Those who apply reasoning conclude in turn: "Just as the fetter of killing, present in the saints without arising, so too with craving for non-existence," and "Just as craving for non-existence with regard to wholesome dharmas is present in the saint without arising, even uncut, so too with craving for non-existence." Their final summary: "The beginning, middle, and end of what you (the Vibhajyavādins) have raised all accord with right reason; what I have said earlier also accords with reason, and cannot be challenged!" Such is the debate between those who apply reasoning and the Vibhajyavādins, conducted throughout by way of sūtra meaning. With that, this portion of the debate draws to a close.

4. Conclusion

The above is a brief analysis of the "refutation of opponents" mentioned in the Mahāvibhāṣā. Taking this as a thread, we can glimpse something of the early development of logic in India:

1. Around 500 BCE, the Buddha was already adept at using dialectical methods to bring out the truth. The "refutation of opponents" methods he employed were later summarized as (1) overcoming, (2) paralleling, and (3) contradicting an opponent's thesis.
2. From around 150 BCE to 100 CE, works such as the Milindapañha, the Jñānaprasthāna, and the Mahāvibhāṣā appeared; throughout this period Buddhist logic inherited the Buddha's methods. The term "Hetuvidyā" arose during this period, and non-Buddhist "Hetuvidyā treatises" appeared as academic works on logic, dividing "refutation of opponents" into (1) suspending judgment, (2) exposing flaws, and (3) removing objections. This system eventually became the mainstream of ancient Indian Hetuvidyā.
3. The term "thesis-meaning" (宗义) first appears in the Mahāvibhāṣā, for instance:

   "Furthermore, to refute the thesis-meaning of others: take the Vibhajyavādins, who hold that the foremost worldly dharma arises in unbroken continuity. They say there are three kinds of continuity: 1) temporal continuity, 2) continuity of birth, and 3) continuity of similarity. Although the foremost worldly dharma lacks the first two, it has the third. The intention here is to refute their view and to show that the foremost worldly dharma arises only for a single moment." (T27, p20b) From the Mahāvibhāṣā's use of "consonant with the thesis, dissonant with its meaning" and "consonant with the meaning, dissonant with the thesis," we can see that "thesis-meaning" combines "thesis" (宗) and "meaning" (义). "Thesis" is the root position of one's own school; "meaning" is the doctrinal reasoning derived from that position.

4. From around 150 CE onward, Buddhist works on Hetuvidyā appeared in succession — the Upāyahṛdaya, the Tattvasaṃgraha, the Pramāṇasamuccaya, the Nyāyapraveśa, the Pramāṇavārttika, and others — each making substantial contributions to Indian Hetuvidyā. All are Buddhist logical systems that grew out of the earlier tradition. (Originally published in Dharma Light Magazine, lightly revised here.)