The Rope and Snake Analogy

Lin Chong-an, 2007

【Example】A mottled grass rope is coiled on a haystack. Because the light is dim, at first glance one mistakes it for a snake. Under bright light, upon careful observation, one clearly sees that it is only a mottled grass rope.

(1) The Svātantrika school holds: a. The "snake" seen when we mistake the grass rope for a snake is imputed by the mind's influence; it is a superimposition, nonexistent, isn't nominally existent, and doesn't exist from its own side. b. The grass rope is imputed by the mind's influence; it is nominally existent, exists, and exists from its own side.

Explanation: The Sub-commentary on "Entering the Middle Way" Clarifying Hidden Meanings states: "That which is imputed by the mind of a valid cognition free of contradiction (and therefore unrefutable) is nominally existent. It is not held that 'everything imputed by the mind is nominally existent.'"

(2) The Prāsaṅgika school holds: a. The "snake" seen when we mistake the grass rope for a snake is established only through conceptual imputation; it is a superimposition, nonexistent, isn't nominally existent, and doesn't exist from its own side. b. The grass rope is established only through conceptual imputation; it is nominally existent, exists, and doesn't exist from its own side.

(3) The shared Madhyamaka view: This very grass rope and this very snake are "ascertained by valid cognition," conform to facts, and are considered "nominally existent." The "snake" that appears when we mistake the rope for a snake, however, is not nominally existent; it is "nonexistent."

(4) Svātantrika Madhyamaka masters hold: This very grass rope is "imputed by the mind's influence," because it is perceived through the observer's limited-capacity senses, and thus does not fully align with the actual grass rope; its appearance and reality are therefore mismatched. It is "not truly existent," and empty of true existence.

(5) Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka masters hold: When observing, we only discern whether something is a rope or a snake once bright light intervenes. This shows that the result of any observation is necessarily shaped by the very act of observing; it is "established only through conceptual imputation," and doesn't exist from its own side.

(6) The Svātantrika position: For Svātantrika, three claims hold universally for all nominally existent phenomena: they are imputed by the mind's influence, exist from their own side, and have intrinsic nature and own-characteristic. Not everything imputed by the mind's influence exists from its own side. Not everything imputed by the mind's influence is nominally existent. Reason: Not everything imputed by the mind's influence is nominally existent, because the snake that appears when we mistake the rope for a snake is imputed by the mind's influence, yet is not nominally existent. All nonexistent phenomena share three universal traits: they are not nominally existent, do not exist from their own side, and lack intrinsic nature and own-characteristic. A truly existent rope exists from its own side, unaffected by any observer, and has intrinsic nature.

(7) The Prāsaṅgika position: For Prāsaṅgika, three claims hold universally for all nominally existent phenomena: they are established only through conceptual imputation, do not exist from their own side, and lack intrinsic nature and own-characteristic. Not everything established only through conceptual imputation exists from its own side. Not everything established only through conceptual imputation is nominally existent. Reason: Not everything established only through conceptual imputation is nominally existent, because the snake that appears when we mistake the rope for a snake is established only through conceptual imputation, yet is not nominally existent. (The same applies to a substantially existent self, a truly existent self, and a self with intrinsic nature: all are established only through conceptual imputation, yet none are nominally existent.) All nonexistent phenomena share three universal traits: they are not nominally existent, do not exist from their own side, and lack intrinsic nature and own-characteristic. Neither truly existent nor false ropes or snakes exist from their own side. All are shaped by the observer, none has intrinsic nature, and all are empty of intrinsic nature. Here, the snake we see when we mistake the rope for a snake is imputed by the mind's influence, and is not nominally existent.

(8) The general process of observation: In the process of observation, we first recognize that the object is "imputed by the mind's influence." Upon closer examination, we see that it is "established only through conceptual imputation." At the first stage, subjective coloring is added to the observed object – as when we mistake a rope for a snake. At the second stage, this subjective coloring is joined by a direct engagement with the object that shapes the object itself.

(9) Application: Since all phenomena are "established only through conceptual imputation," mutual influence between people is unavoidable. A person's ability to move from having no spiritual potential to possessing spiritual potential rests on this same principle: maturation and liberation are possible through the influence of wise external teachers. Likewise, a bodhisattva's work of guiding and teaching sentient beings relies entirely on this mutual influence. This is the core principle of emptiness of intrinsic nature and emptiness of own-characteristic, and a key extended meaning of the idea that phenomena are "established only through conceptual imputation." As the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: "It is through the truth of emptiness that all phenomena come to fruition." On the other hand, greed and aversion also arise through dependent origination. It is clear, then, that our love and hatred toward others always carry our own subjective tint, shaped by our interactions. All of this arises dependently, with no inherent self. Through the wisdom of introspection, we can loosen our grip on self-grasping, and avoid being swept up in the whirlpool of love and hatred. Only in this way can both favorable and adverse circumstances in life become opportunities for growth – this is what is meant by "transforming afflictions into bodhi."

(10) Further Inquiry: The Zhangjia Outline of Tenets explains that the "mind" in the phrase "imputed by the mind's influence" refers to a perception free of error, and therefore unrefutable. Since this "mind" is defined as a non-deluded valid cognition, the following claim follows: "Whatever exists is nominally existent, and imputed by the mind's influence. Whatever is imputed by the mind's influence is nominally existent." This claim conflicts with Tsongkhapa's position in the Sub-commentary on "Entering the Middle Way" Clarifying Hidden Meanings, which states: "It is not held that 'everything imputed by the mind's influence is nominally existent.'"