Master Gangxiao: Interpreting the Ancient Commentaries on Xuanzang's *True Consciousness-Only Syllogism*

Master Gangxiao: Interpreting the Ancient Commentaries on Xuanzang's True Consciousness-Only Syllogism

Gang Xiao

Abstract: The logical form of Xuanzang’s True Consciousness-Only Syllogism has drawn widely differing interpretations since it was first recorded. This article looks at several of the most influential ancient commentaries still extant today. The explanations offered by Master Wengui and Master Kuiji are particularly insightful, since both studied directly under Xuanzang and received his oral teachings. Master Yanshou’s reading, by contrast, veers completely into the trap of idle, abstract debate—what the text calls “sipping tea and chatting about the Dao”—and his misreading led later figures like Master Ouyi to follow him further down this wrong path. Keywords: zhengu (ultimate truth), jicheng (mutually accepted / prasiddha), zixu (self-accepted / svasaṃvitti), essential form (bhūta-rūpa), image-form (ākāra-rūpa / nimitta-rūpa)

Xuanzang’s True Consciousness-Only Syllogism is just twenty-three characters long: “真故极成色非定离眼识 [1], 自许初三 [2] 摄, 眼 [3] 所不摄故, 如眼识”. Its brevity left enormous room for later interpretation. And because Xuanzang deployed this syllogism in live debate, not as a product of idle study, any reading of it needs to hold the original context and atmosphere of those debates in mind. Later commentators who missed that context inevitably landed on misreadings.

I. Master Wengui’s Interpretation

Of the surviving sources, Master Wengui’s commentary is the earliest. He wrote the Commentary on the Nyāyapraveśa (often shortened to the Zhuangyan Commentary), and since he studied directly under Xuanzang, most of its content records Xuanzang’s own oral explanations [4]. That said, Wengui’s approach to scholarship was often criticized. For instance, he and Lü Cai changed the phrase “due to the nature of distinction” (biebao xing gu) in Xuanzang’s translation of the Nyāyapraveśa to “taking distinction as its nature” (biebao wei xing). Kuiji criticized this move gently but firmly: “To alter the original text on one’s own authority is deeply blameworthy [5].” Huizhao was far harsher: “If they were working as translators, one might allow changes to fix meaning; but he even alters the text he is supposed to be commenting on! How can changing the original treatise ever be acceptable? [6]” We will set aside the question of text alteration here, and focus only on Wengui’s interpretation of the True Consciousness-Only Syllogism.

Wengui’s explanation of the syllogism is extremely brief, and not a full analysis: he only discusses the term “self-accepted” (zixu) within the reason branch—

Question: If we set the proposition (pratijñā) “In ultimate truth, mutually accepted form is not necessarily separate from eye-consciousness,” with the reason (hetu) “because it is self-accepted as included in the first three, and not subsumed under the eye faculty [7],” and the similar example (sādharmya) “like eye-consciousness” — since this reason includes the phrase “self-accepted,” can it still be counted as mutually accepted (jicheng) [8]?

The question asks: the reason branch of a Hetu-vidyā syllogism requires all terms to be mutually accepted. But the reason branch of the True Consciousness-Only Syllogism adds the qualifying phrase “self-accepted,” which means it is no longer mutually accepted — it is only acknowledged by the person putting forward the syllogism. Wengui analyzes and answers as follows:

Here, “self-accepted” does not rule out the opponent’s agreement, because the opponent also accepts that mutually accepted form is included in the first three and not subsumed under the eye faculty. The other case — where “self-accepted” does exclude the opponent’s view — applies to [the example of] space: the opponent does not accept space as a basis for qualities (guṇa), so the two situations are not comparable. (Ibid.)

Wengui was not specifically explicating the True Consciousness-Only Syllogism here; he was commenting on a line from the Nyāyapraveśa: “Space exists, because it is the basis for qualities. For those who deny space, the basis [for this claim] is not established.” His explanation of this line runs long, covering many different cases, including inferences established for one’s own position (zibiliang) and inferences established to convince others (tabiliang). In the course of this, he discusses the syllogism “The self I accept is real, because I accept it as a basis for qualities,” noting that this is an inference established only for one’s own side. It is this discussion that leads him to introduce Xuanzang’s True Consciousness-Only Syllogism. The passage quoted from Wengui’s Zhuangyan Commentary above clarifies that the “self-accepted” (zixu) in the reason branch of the True Consciousness-Only Syllogism does not exclude the opponent’s agreement, since the opponent also concedes that mutually accepted form is included in the first three and not subsumed under the eye faculty. The syllogism “The self I accept is real, because I accept it as a basis for qualities,” by contrast, does exclude the opponent’s view. In other words, Xuanzang’s syllogism cannot be lumped together with this earlier, self-referential syllogism. Next, an opponent raises a question:

Since the opponent already agrees with this point, why add the qualifier “self-accepted” at all? Wouldn’t that only create unnecessary ambiguity? (Ibid.)

Wengui replies:

This is to block a contradictory objection, so the phrase “self-accepted” is necessary. The opponent will raise a counterargument: mutually accepted form should be “form not identical to consciousness,” because it is self-accepted as included in the first three and not subsumed under the eye faculty, just like eye-consciousness. To block this, we respond: Is this mutually accepted form like eye-consciousness — self-accepted as included in the first three, not subsumed under the eye faculty, and therefore form not identical to consciousness? Or is it like the form of Buddhas in other realms, accepted by our tradition — self-accepted as included in the first three, not subsumed under the eye faculty, and therefore form identical to consciousness? Without the phrase “self-accepted,” we cannot use an indefinite fallacy to block this contradictory challenge. (Ibid.)

Without that phrase, a contradictory fallacy (xiangwei guo) would open up. The scenario runs like this: originally, the Great Vehicle Yogācāra theorists put forward this syllogism:

Proposition: In ultimate truth, mutually accepted form is not necessarily separate from eye-consciousness (it is not distinct from eye-consciousness). Reason: Because it is included in the first three, and not subsumed under the eye faculty. Example: Like eye-consciousness.

This syllogism’s reason branch has no “self-accepted” qualifier. The Sammitīya logicians argued that the Great Vehicle Yogācāra syllogism was flawed: the differentiated states (youfa chabie) of its subject (dharmin) should cover both “form separate from eye-consciousness” and “form not separate from eye-consciousness,” since the self-characteristic (youfa zixiang) of the subject is “mutually accepted form in ultimate truth.” With two distinct differentiations of the subject, the Yogācāra theorists should have included both to be complete. Instead, they only state that form is not separate from eye-consciousness, which is invalid. The Sammitīya school could easily formulate a contradictory syllogism in response:

Proposition: In ultimate truth, mutually accepted form is not identical to consciousness (it is not non-separate from eye-consciousness). Reason: Because it is self-accepted as included in the first three, and not subsumed under the eye faculty. Example: Like eye-consciousness.

Wengui’s point is that without the “self-accepted” qualifier, the Sammitīya school could advance this contradictory syllogism. In the contradictory syllogism Wengui describes, the reason branch adds just two characters: “self-accepted” (zixu). Wengui’s Zhuangyan Commentary originally ran three volumes. It was transmitted to Japan, where only the first volume and a fragment of the third survived. The fragment was renamed the Commentary on the Fourteen Fallacious Classes of the Nyāyamukha in the early Song dynasty, and another fragment was found in the 20th-century Jin Tripitaka of Zhaocheng. Lü Cheng and other scholars from the Inner Studies Institute collated these materials. Lü Cheng wrote: “Drawing on citations of Wengui’s views in Zhenzhu’s Bright Lamp Copy, Mingquan’s Grand Commentary Notes, and Zangjun’s Grand Commentary Excerpts, we have corrected the text of the surviving first volume and compiled the lost passages of the second and third volumes. We have also filled gaps using the Commentary on the Fourteen Fallacious Classes, arranging material according to the original treatise to roughly reconstruct its original form [10].” Still, examining sources like the Bright Lamp Copy, the contradictory syllogism put forward by the opponent contains no “self-accepted” qualifier at all.

There is a second syllogism put forward by the opponent that does include the “self-accepted” qualifier:

Proposition: In ultimate truth, mutually accepted form is not necessarily separate from eye-consciousness. Reason: Because it is self-accepted as an object of one’s own consciousness. Similar Example: Like sound.

This syllogism also uses “self-accepted,” but it is entirely separate from the earlier contradictory syllogism. In fact, adding the qualifier to that contradictory syllogism would make it incoherent. If “self-accepted” were omitted, both the Yogācāra theorists’ syllogism and the Sammitīya contradictory syllogism would share the exact same reason branch: “because it is included in the first three, and not subsumed under the eye faculty” (and the same example: “like eye-consciousness”). Their propositions, however, would be exact opposites. This move is identical to the “proving two opposing propositions as equally valid” technique listed under the “dissimilarity of no difference” fallacy among the fourteen fallacious refutations.

Naturally, the Yogācāra side could not let the Sammitīya school get away with this move. They pressed the Sammitīya logicians to clarify exactly what they meant by “mutually accepted form”: Did they mean something like eye-consciousness, which you [the Sammitīya] “self-accept” [11] as included in the first three and not subsumed under the eye faculty, making it “form not identical to consciousness”? Or did they mean the form of Buddhas in other realms, which our Great Vehicle accepts (and the Hīnayāna traditions do not), which you “self-accept” [12] as included in the first three and not subsumed under the eye faculty, making it “form identical to consciousness”? If they mean the former, like eye-consciousness, that is only your Sammitīya school’s own claim that it is “not identical to consciousness” — we Yogācāra theorists do not accept that label. If they mean the latter, like the form of Buddhas in other realms, that is precisely the Great Vehicle Yogācāra position. Your contradictory syllogism is therefore invalid, and this blocks the Sammitīya school’s contradictory challenge. Why does the Sammitīya school claim that “like eye-consciousness” counts as “form not identical to consciousness”? The first three categories are eye-consciousness, the eye faculty, and the form realm. Eye-consciousness is one of these three, and it cannot be subsumed under the eye faculty. Eye-consciousness can only belong to eye-consciousness itself~~ how could it possibly be “not identical to consciousness”? This is the same logic as the common Chan saying “Water does not wash water; dust does not stain dust.” Because of this principle, the Sammitīya school argues that eye-consciousness is “not identical to consciousness.”

Turning back to Xuanzang’s True Consciousness-Only Syllogism: Xuanzang added the “self-accepted” qualifier to the reason branch of the Great Vehicle Yogācāra theorists’ original syllogism, so it reads “self-accepted as included in the first three, and not subsumed under the eye faculty.” Standard accounts hold that without this qualifier, the Sammitīya school could have advanced the following contradictory syllogism: “In ultimate truth, mutually accepted form is form not identical to consciousness (it is not non-separate from eye-consciousness); because it is included in the first three and not subsumed under the eye faculty, like eye-consciousness.” When Xuanzang added “self-accepted” to the Yogācāra side’s reason branch, the meaning shifts: the proposition still refers to mutually accepted form, but the qualifier expands the scope of the subject in the reason branch to include “mutually accepted form plus things like the form of Buddhas in other realms, which Hīnayāna traditions do not accept.” Xuanzang’s “self-accepted” qualifier only modifies the first half of the reason branch: “self-accepted as included in the first three.” This widens the scope of “mutually accepted form” in the proposition to cover items like the form of Buddhas in other realms.

Wengui writes here: “If one does not say ‘self-accepted,’ one cannot use an indefinite fallacy to block the contradictory challenge.” Without the qualifier, the reasoning fails to function as an indefinite fallacy that blocks contradiction. An indefinite fallacy (buding guo) arises when there are two mutually exclusive possibilities: Condition A and Condition B. Only one can be true; they cannot both hold, nor can they both be false. But we have no way to determine which condition is correct. If A is established, B cannot be; if B is established, A cannot be. This uncertainty is what makes the fallacy “indefinite.” Debates in Hetu-vidyā (Buddhist logic) require a conclusive result. If we cannot determine which condition is valid, there is no resolution — which is not permitted in the system. Only an indefinite fallacy can block a contradictory challenge: once Condition A is established, Condition B cannot arise at all, so the contradiction is neutralized. Applied to this specific syllogism: the subject of the proposition, “mutually accepted form,” is either like eye-consciousness — “included in the first three and not subsumed under the eye faculty” (and therefore not separate from consciousness) — or like the form of Buddhas in other realms, accepted by the Great Vehicle but not by Hīnayāna — “included in the first three and not subsumed under the eye faculty” (and therefore separate from consciousness). One is separate from consciousness, the other is not. Only one of these two possibilities can be true, so they are contradictory. But since we cannot determine which is correct, the situation is indefinite. Because it is indefinite, the contradiction cannot emerge. The Great Vehicle Yogācāra syllogism and the Sammitīya syllogism are contradictory, but the indefiniteness means this contradiction can never actually arise (the opposing claims of “separate from consciousness” and “not separate from consciousness” cannot both be validated).

Next, the opponent raises another question:

“Simply stating ‘included in the first three, and not subsumed under the eye faculty’ is already enough to create an indefinite fallacy. Why is the phrase ‘self-accepted’ necessary at all? [13]”

In other words: as long as the reason includes “included in the first three, and not subsumed under the eye faculty,” the reasoning is already indefinite. The two characters “self-accepted” (zixu) are completely redundant. Wengui explains:

If we omit “self-accepted,” we fall into the fallacy of the opponent’s indefinite (tabuding guo). The opponent can then frame an indefinite fallacy like this: Is mutually accepted form, “like eye-consciousness — included in the first three, not subsumed under the eye faculty — thus not necessarily separate from eye-consciousness”? Or is it “like the defiled form of Śākyamuni Bodhisattva in his final incarnation, which our school accepts [14] — included in the first three, not subsumed under the eye faculty — thus definitely separate from eye-consciousness”? This is why the phrase “self-accepted” is included.

In other words, without “self-accepted,” the fallacy of the opponent’s indefinite arises. Indefinite fallacies come in three varieties: self-indefinite, opponent-indefinite, and shared indefinite. The Sammitīya opponent could frame the question this way: Is mutually accepted form, “like eye-consciousness, included in the first three and not subsumed under the eye faculty,” therefore not separate from consciousness? Or is it “like the defiled form of Śākyamuni in his final life as a bodhisattva, which we Hīnayāna followers accept but Great Vehicle Yogācāra theorists do not — included in the first three and not subsumed under the eye faculty,” therefore definitely separate from consciousness? To avoid this outcome, the qualifier “self-accepted” was added to the reason branch of the True Consciousness-Only Syllogism.

If we said “mutually accepted as included in the first three, and not subsumed under the eye faculty” to avoid this fallacy, we would not be able to use an indefinite fallacy to block their contradictory challenge. That is why the text specifies only “self-accepted.” (Ibid.)

This means that to avoid creating an anaikāntika (indefinite) fault against the opponent: if we omit the restrictive qualifier "self-accepted" (svādhya, i.e., accepted by one’s own school) and instead add "commonly accepted" (prasiddha), is that valid? That is, changing the hetu (reason) clause to read "commonly accepted, included in the first triad, and not subsumed by the visual faculty"—Master Wengui says this is not permissible. Why is the use of "commonly accepted" even raised here? Primarily, the rules of Buddhist logic (Hetuvidyā) dictate that the hetu of an inferential syllogism must be commonly accepted. In practice, inferential syllogisms are assumed to have a commonly accepted hetu unless explicitly stated otherwise, so the phrase "commonly accepted" is almost always redundant. Specifically, for the syllogisms put forward by Mahāyāna Yogācāra theorists and the Sammitīya school, adding "commonly accepted" to the hetu would prevent it from triggering an indefinite fault against the Sammitīya’s contradictory objection syllogism. This is why only "self-accepted" works: adding that qualifier forces a choice between the two possibilities—"not separate from visual consciousness" and "not not-separate from visual consciousness"—which creates an indefinite fault. The Sammitīya’s "not not-separate from visual consciousness" is a contradictory objection to the Yogācāra position of "not separate from visual consciousness." Our "self-accepted" qualifier turns your contradictory objection into an indefinite fault, which means your objection is invalid.

To sum up, in Xuanzang’s True Consciousness-Only Syllogism, adding "self-accepted" to the hetu serves two purposes. First, it broadens the scope of the subject term "form" (rūpa) to include things the Hīnayāna rejects, such as the forms of Buddhas in other realms. Second, it blocks the Sammitīya’s contradictory objection by turning their opposing syllogism into an indefinite fault.

In Volume 4 of Master Wengui’s Zhuangyan Shu (Proper Adornment Commentary), he states:

In objections to the Consciousness-Only inference [15], one argues: commonly accepted form cannot be form identical with consciousness, for it is commonly accepted, subsumed under the first triad, and not encompassed by the visual faculty, just as visual consciousness is. This inference only contradicts the form identical with consciousness accepted by the opponent, and does not contradict our own accepted form separate from consciousness; thus it counts as a fallacious refutation. [16]

This passage comes from Master Wengui’s explanation of the “equally established two propositions” (deng cheng er zong). The Sammitīya school argues: “I put forward the inference ‘commonly accepted form cannot be form identical with consciousness, because it is commonly accepted, subsumed under the first triad, and not encompassed by the visual faculty, just as visual consciousness is.’ My syllogism only contradicts the form identical with consciousness accepted by Mahāyāna Yogācāra theorists, and does not contradict my Sammitīya school’s form separate from consciousness. This should also count as a case of ‘equally established two propositions’—and ‘equally established two propositions’ is classified as a fallacious refutation in Dignāga’s system of Buddhist logic.” Master Wengui counters that the Sammitīya’s syllogism is not a fallacious refutation, but rather falls under “valid refutations” [17]. Why? Master Wengui cites examples like “sound is permanent” and “sound is impermanent” to illustrate his point:

Why is this? “Permanent” and “impermanent” are merely attributes (dharma), both referring to the same single entity—the sound that serves as the subject (dharmin)—and cannot distinctly mark out a position as one’s own or the opponent’s. If the sound that is the subject of the “impermanent” attribute simply did not exist, then the claim “sound is impermanent” would be a fallacious refutation, as it contradicts accepted views. But “identical with consciousness” and “separate from consciousness” are not attributes of the same entity; they are distinct designations of one’s own and the opponent’s subjects. If form identical with consciousness does not exist, form separate from consciousness still remains; thus, a refutation that only contradicts the opponent is a valid refutation, not a fallacious one. [18]

The point is that both “permanent” and “impermanent” are predicates of sound. For the claim “sound is permanent,” if there were no such thing as “impermanent sound” in the world at all, then “sound is impermanent” would count as a fallacious refutation. But “identical with consciousness” and “separate from consciousness” both refer to form: even if form identical with consciousness does not exist, form separate from consciousness still exists. A refutation of this kind is valid, not fallacious.

Master Wengui’s overall verdict on Xuanzang’s True Consciousness-Only Syllogism is: “It exhausts the subtleties with great precision; students should reflect on it carefully for themselves” (Vol. 4, p. 14).

II. Master Kuiji’s Interpretation

In Volume 3 of Master Kuiji’s Commentary on the Nyāyapraveśa (abbreviated as the Great Commentary on Buddhist Logic), we find his interpretation of the True Consciousness-Only Syllogism. It appears in The Manji Shinsan Dainihon Zokuzōkyō (卍续藏经), Vol. 86, p. 0743. Master Kuiji first addresses why this syllogism does not count as a “contradiction of worldly understanding” (lokavighāta).

Why does it not violate common worldly understanding? Because everyone in the world holds that form is separate from consciousness. (Upper column)

The world at large holds that form is separate from consciousness, yet Xuanzang’s True Consciousness-Only Syllogism claims form is not separate from visual consciousness. Why does this not count as a contradiction of worldly understanding? Master Kuiji explains:

In Buddhist logic, as long as the thesis and the hetu carry restrictive qualifiers, no fault arises. (Upper column)

Master Kuiji’s opening question only addresses “contradiction with worldly understanding,” a fault specific to the thesis. But his response does not stop there: he explains every possible fault that could emerge. Xuanzang added restrictive qualifiers to both the thesis (the proposition) and the hetu (reason): he added “ultimately true” and “commonly accepted” to the thesis. “Ultimately true” signals that the claim is framed from the perspective of ultimate truth, not conventional truth, so it does not contradict the views of ordinary, non-scholarly people. It also signals that the claim is framed from the Mahāyāna’s supreme philosophical standpoint, not the Hīnayāna’s; thus it does not contradict the Hīnayāna Āgama teaching that “form exists separate from consciousness,” and does not conflict with the worldview of Hīnayāna scholars.

The phrase “commonly accepted” eliminates two Hīnayāna exceptions: the defiled form of a Buddha in his final life, and the afflicted form of all Buddha bodies. Without this qualifier, the fault of “a portion of one’s own subject being unestablished” [19] would arise. Mahāyāna teachings recognize the forms of Buddhas across the ten directions (which Master Wengui’s text calls “forms of Buddhas from other realms”) and the unafflicted forms of Buddhas, but the Hīnayāna does not accept these. If “commonly accepted” were omitted, this would trigger the fault of “a portion of the opponent’s subject being unestablished” [20].

The hetu of the True Consciousness-Only Syllogism also includes the qualifier “self-accepted.” Master Kuiji says this guards against the fault of “contradiction with the implied difference of the subject.” For the Mahāyāna Yogācāra syllogism—“Ultimately true, commonly accepted form is not definitively separate from visual consciousness; because it is subsumed under the first triad and not encompassed by the visual faculty; like visual consciousness”—“ultimately true, commonly accepted form” is the explicit characteristic of the subject (dharmin), and “not definitively separate from visual consciousness” is the explicit characteristic of the predicate (dharma). The implied difference of the subject covers two possibilities: “form definitively separate from visual consciousness” and “form not definitively separate from visual consciousness.” The position the Mahāyāna Yogācāra theorists implicitly endorse is “form not separate from visual consciousness.” Opponents argue that the implied difference of the subject has two facets, and the Mahāyāna theorists’ position fails to account for both. If the Mahāyāna syllogism were valid, opponents could put forward this opposing syllogism: “Ultimately true, commonly accepted form is not form identical with consciousness (i.e., not not-separate from visual consciousness); because it is subsumed under the first triad and not encompassed by the visual faculty; like visual consciousness.”

The clearest difference between the contradictory syllogism Master Kuiji cites from opponents, and the one Master Wengui puts forward, is that Master Kuiji’s version omits the “self-accepted” qualifier from its hetu. Master Kuiji’s Great Commentary on Buddhist Logic was written after Master Wengui’s Zhuangyan Shu, and cites the earlier work in many places; here, Master Kuiji corrects an error in Master Wengui’s commentary. To show that both the Mahāyāna Yogācāra syllogism and the Sammitīya’s differentiating contradictory syllogism are invalid, Master Kuiji uses the exact same method as Master Wengui: he points out the indefinite fault. The hetu “because it is subsumed under the first triad and not encompassed by the visual faculty (along with the example ‘like visual consciousness’)” cannot, on its own, determine whether “commonly accepted form” is separate from consciousness or not. We omit the full detailed analysis here.

Master Kuiji also offers a detailed breakdown of the hetu in the True Consciousness-Only Syllogism. He states:

If one does not include “subsumed under the first triad,” and only states “because it is not encompassed by the visual faculty,” an indefinite fault arises: Is commonly accepted form, like visual consciousness—because it is not encompassed by the visual faculty—definitively not separate from visual consciousness? Or is it, like the other five triads [21]—because it is not encompassed by the visual faculty—definitively separate from visual consciousness? If one holds that the five triads, though not encompassed by the visual faculty, are also not separate from visual consciousness, this contradicts one’s own school’s position. To avoid this fault, the phrase “subsumed under the first triad” is included. (Lower column)

In other words, if the syllogism read “Ultimately true, commonly accepted form is not separate from visual consciousness; because it is not encompassed by the visual faculty,” the Sammitīya could raise this objection: Is the “commonly accepted form” you Yogācāra theorists refer to, like visual consciousness, not encompassed by the visual faculty and thus not separate from visual consciousness? Or is it like the other five triads, not encompassed by the visual faculty yet definitively separate from visual consciousness? If the five triads are not encompassed by the visual faculty but are also not separate from visual consciousness, that contradicts the Mahāyāna school’s own position (the Mahāyāna does not hold that the other five triads are not separate from visual consciousness). This is why “subsumed under the first triad” is a necessary addition.

Omitting the phrase “not encompassed by the visual faculty” also creates problems. Including it rules out both the indefinite fault and the fault of definitive contradiction with the predicate’s explicit characteristic:

If one does not say “not encompassed by the visual faculty,” but only states “because it is subsumed under the first triad,” an indefinite objection arises: Is commonly accepted form, like visual consciousness—because it is subsumed under the first triad—definitively not separate from visual consciousness? Or is it, like the visual faculty—because it is subsumed under the first triad—not definitively not separate from visual consciousness? Since Mahāyāna masters hold that the visual faculty is not definitively, invariably separate from visual consciousness, this indefinite objection takes the form “not definitively not separate from visual consciousness,” rather than “definitively separate from visual consciousness.” One can also formulate a contradictory syllogism against the predicate’s explicit characteristic [22]: “Ultimately true, commonly accepted form is not not-separate from visual consciousness; because it is subsumed under the first triad; like the visual faculty.” This in turn gives rise to a definitive contradiction. To avoid these three faults, the phrase “not encompassed by the visual faculty” is included. (From lower column of p. 0743 to upper column of p. 0744)

In other words, omitting “not encompassed by the visual faculty” and using only “subsumed under the first triad” opens the door to both an indefinite fault and a fault of definitive contradiction with the predicate’s explicit characteristic. Here is how the indefinite fault arises:

The Sammitīya could argue: Is the commonly accepted form you Yogācāra theorists refer to, like visual consciousness, subsumed under the first triad and thus definitively not separate from visual consciousness? Or is it like the visual faculty, subsumed under the first triad and thus not definitively not separate from visual consciousness? Mahāyāna teachings hold that the relationship between the visual faculty and visual consciousness is “neither identical nor separate” (naikatya nānātva). For this reason, the objection frames it as “not definitively not separate from visual consciousness,” rather than “definitively separate from visual consciousness.” To understand why the visual faculty and visual consciousness are described as neither identical nor separate: the visual faculty is form, while visual consciousness is not form; form and non-form are distinct, hence “not identical.” The visual faculty is the cause, and visual consciousness is the effect; cause and effect are a single continuum, the cause is the effect, and they are inseparable, hence “not separate.”

It is important to be clear here: in everyday usage, “not definitively not separate from visual consciousness” and “definitively separate from visual consciousness” are functionally identical, both meaning “separate from visual consciousness.” But in Buddhist philosophical usage, the negation particle “not” (fei) negates the state described by the terms that follow it. That is, “not definitively not separate from visual consciousness” does not affirm any positive state at all. This point is emphasized in the Nyāyapraveśa, which uses the examples of “permanent/impermanent” and “created/uncreated” to illustrate:

Here, the term “permanent” expresses “not impermanent”; the term “uncreated” expresses “not created”; just as what does not exist is called “non-existent.” [23]

As for the fault of definitive contradiction with the predicate’s explicit characteristic: this occurs when one puts forward the syllogism “Ultimately true, commonly accepted form is not not-separate from visual consciousness; because it is subsumed under the first triad; like the visual faculty.” Compared to the Mahāyāna’s established syllogism—“Ultimately true, commonly accepted form is not separate from visual consciousness; because it is subsumed under the first triad; like visual consciousness”—this constitutes a contradiction of the predicate’s explicit characteristic. The so-called “predicate’s explicit characteristic” refers to the Mahāyāna syllogism’s “not separate from visual consciousness,” and the opponent’s syllogism’s “not not-separate from visual consciousness.” These two explicit characteristics of the predicate are directly opposed, which is what is meant by “contradiction of the predicate’s explicit characteristic.”

Master Kuiji goes on to note that this “gives rise to a definitive contradiction” (viruddhavyabhicārin). In the Nyāyapraveśa, this is called “inconclusive opposition”: it refers to a situation where both the proponent and opponent put forward syllogisms that fully satisfy the three valid characteristics of a reason, but their respective propositions are directly opposed, leaving no way to reach a definitive conclusion. That said, I believe Master Kuiji is mistaken here: a “definitive contradiction” of this kind is absolutely impossible to arise. Both the Mahāyāna syllogism—“Ultimately true, commonly accepted form is not separate from visual consciousness; because it is subsumed under the first triad; like visual consciousness”—and the Sammitīya’s syllogism—“Ultimately true, commonly accepted form is not not-separate from visual consciousness; because it is subsumed under the first triad; like the visual faculty”—are flawed. Take the Mahāyāna syllogism’s second valid characteristic of a reason, “presence of the reason in similar instances”: does it hold? The manifestation of this second characteristic is the homogenous example basis, and the Mahāyāna syllogism’s example basis “like visual consciousness” is not accepted by the Hīnayāna. The Sammitīya argues that “visual consciousness is non-identical with consciousness (as form).” As for the Sammitīya’s syllogism, its example basis is “the visual faculty,” but in Mahāyāna Yogācāra thought, the visual faculty is also not separate from consciousness, so the Mahāyāna does not accept the Sammitīya’s syllogism either. For this reason, the “definitive contradiction” Master Kuiji describes could never actually occur. He is clearly in error here. And because of this error, his following claim is also wrong: he writes “to avoid these three faults,” when it should read “to avoid these two faults,” not three.

While interpreting Xuanzang’s True Consciousness-Only Syllogism, Master Kuiji also references a case study: the Silla monk Master Shunqing once put forward the following contradictory syllogism against it:

Ultimately true, commonly accepted form is definitively separate from visual consciousness; self-accepted as subsumed under the first triad, and not encompassed by visual consciousness; like the visual faculty. [24] (p. 0744, lower column)

We have no detailed records of exactly how Xuanzang debated others during the eighteen days of the non-sectarian assembly hosted by King Śīlāditya (Harsha), so we cannot say for certain. Master Shunqing’s contradictory syllogism fills a small gap in our knowledge of these debates. Master Kuiji lists six faults in this syllogism at once:

The earlier discussion of Consciousness-Only relies on a commonly accepted inference, but this [syllogism] relies on a self-established position… Thus, an inference based on a self-accepted premise cannot be used to argue against a commonly accepted one. (p. 0744, lower column)

This is the first flaw in the syllogism put forward by Master Shunjing. To put it simply: in Buddhist logic (Hetuvidya), inferential syllogisms (比量, pramāṇa) fall into three categories: self-established (自比量, svārthānumāna), other-established (他比量, parārthānumāna), and mutually established (共比量). Xuanzang’s True Consciousness-Only Syllogism is a mutually established one, while Shunjing’s contradictory syllogism is self-established—and a self-established syllogism can never refute a mutually established one. Why is Xuanzang’s True Consciousness-Only Syllogism a mutually established syllogism? Simply put, its thesis premises (宗依) and examples (喻) are both mutually acknowledged (共许). As for the qualifying phrase (简别语) “from the ultimate perspective” (真故, zhengu) at the start of the thesis, both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna accept the two truths (conventional and ultimate), so adding this qualifier does not affect its status as a mutually established syllogism. As for its reason (因支), “included in the first three [categories of sense objects], not included in the eye [consciousness]” was originally mutually accepted; adding the qualifier “self-accepted” (自许) expands the scope of the reason. To break it down: the concept “included in the first three, not included in the eye” is contained within the extension of “self-accepted as included in the first three, not included in the eye.” Would this change its status as a mutually established syllogism? No. We can use an analogy to make this clear: consider the two concepts “China’s border” and “the shared border of China and North Korea.” The thesis of the True Consciousness-Only Syllogism refers to the mutually accepted “shared border of China and North Korea,” while the reason refers to “China’s border.” Even though the reason broadens the extension of the thesis, the overlapping mutually accepted portion remains, so we call it an adapted mutually established syllogism—not a self-established one. This adaptation was not Xuanzang’s original invention; he built on the work of Master Dharmapāla. In Dharmapāla’s Great Commentary on the Hundred Treatise (《大乘广百论释论》), there is a matching syllogism:

Past and future dharmas universally acknowledged by both parties have no separate existence apart from the present; because they are included in the time periods accepted by our own school; just like the present. ［25］ Xuanzang’s True Consciousness-Only Syllogism is identical to Master Dharmapāla’s. As for Master Shunjing’s contradictory syllogism, while its reason also includes the phrase “self-accepted” on the surface, making it look identical to Xuanzang’s, there is a fundamental difference. If Shunjing’s syllogism did not include “self-accepted,” it would commit the fallacy of being unestablished for one party (随一不成). This is because the Mahāyāna Yogācāra school rejects the reason “included in the first three, not included in visual consciousness” entirely: in Yogācāra thought, form is subsumed under visual consciousness. Shunjing added “self-accepted” to avoid this fallacy, which turned it into a self-established syllogism. This is why Master Kuiji states that a self-established syllogism cannot refute a mutually established one. Furthermore, the thesis subject is marked as “mutually established” (极成), a term only appropriate for mutually established syllogisms, while the reason uses “self-accepted,” a term reserved for self-established syllogisms. These do not align. (p. 0744, lower column) This is the second flaw in Shunjing’s contradictory syllogism. The “self-accepted” in its reason cannot be compared to the “self-accepted” in Xuanzang’s True Consciousness-Only Syllogism at all. In Xuanzang’s syllogism, the thesis and reason are aligned: both belong to a mutually established syllogism. But in Shunjing’s syllogism, the thesis is mutually established while the reason is self-established—they do not match. Furthermore, the reason commits the fallacy of being unestablished for one party. The Mahāyāna school does not accept the claim “not included in visual consciousness” at all; Shunjing only accepts this himself, but the reason is meant to apply to form that both sides mutually acknowledge. (p. 0744, lower column) This is the third flaw in Shunjing’s contradictory syllogism. The claim “not included in visual consciousness” in its reason is entirely rejected by Mahāyāna Yogācāra, which is exactly the fallacy of being unestablished for one party (in Buddhist logic, the reason of a syllogism must be mutually accepted and established). Furthermore, the parallel example also fails to establish the stated predicate. In Mahāyāna doctrine, the eye faculty is not definitively separate from visual consciousness: the faculty is the cause, and consciousness the effect, so they are neither definitively identical nor definitively separate. What’s more, the wisdom of accomplishing activities (成事智) ［26］ commonly takes the eye faculty as its object, and there is a definitive distinction between the indirect objective condition and the apprehending visual consciousness. (p. 0744, lower column) This is the fourth flaw in Shunjing’s contradictory syllogism. Here Master Kuiji refutes Shunjing entirely on the basis of Yogācāra theory, so we will skip the details for brevity. Furthermore, when the proponent uses “self-accepted” in a mutually established syllogism, it serves to rule out the contradictory implications of the subject’s implicit alternatives. When the opponent uses “self-accepted,” it signals reliance on a self-established syllogism’s claim that “visual consciousness does not include it”—how can these two uses be consistent? (p. 0744, lower column) This is the fifth flaw in Shunjing’s contradictory syllogism. The “self-accepted” in Xuanzang’s True Consciousness-Only Syllogism does not compromise the syllogism’s status as mutually established, but the “self-accepted” in Shunjing’s syllogism only expresses his personal view that “it is not included in visual consciousness,” which makes it a self-established syllogism. Furthermore, in his syllogism, both the thesis and the example rely on mutually established premises, while only the reason relies on a self-established premise; all three are fundamentally at odds. ［27］ (p. 0744, lower column) This is the sixth flaw in Shunjing’s contradictory syllogism, but it is essentially a restatement of the earlier points. The six flaws Master Kuiji lists are largely repetitive: the fifth and sixth are nearly identical to the first and second. In fact, there is one more oversight in Shunjing’s syllogism: the qualifying phrase “from the ultimate perspective” (真故) in the thesis is entirely superfluous and serves no purpose at all.

III. Master Huizhao’s Interpretation

Master Huizhao authored the Essentials of the Meaning of the Nyāyapraveśa (《因明入正理论义纂要》), which also includes his reading of the True Consciousness-Only Syllogism. Regarding Xuanzang’s purpose in formulating the True Consciousness-Only Syllogism, Master Huizhao notes:

It is said that the Tripiṭaka Master [Xuanzang] formulated it to counter contradictory syllogisms. ［28］ This aligns with the accounts of Master Wengui and Master Kuiji. What did this contradictory syllogism look like, exactly? The contradictory syllogism states: From the ultimate perspective, commonly established form should not be form identical to consciousness; because it is self-accepted as included in the first three [categories of sense objects], and not included in the eye [consciousness]; just like visual consciousness. (p. 0863, lower column) The contradictory syllogism Huizhao cites aligns with Master Wengui’s version, but differs from the one Master Kuiji records. The version most widely used today is Kuiji’s, which omits the “self-accepted” qualifier from the reason. To refute this contradictory syllogism, Master Huizhao uses the same approach as Wengui and Kuiji: pointing out it commits the fallacy of uncertainty (不定过): Is it like visual consciousness, which you self-accept as included in the first three, and therefore not identical to consciousness? Or is it like the form of Buddhas in other realms, which our school self-accepts as included in the first three, and therefore identical to consciousness? The Sammatīya (正量部) school’s contradictory syllogism is deeply flawed. Master Huizhao breaks down the issue as follows: [The opponent] objects: this is not the case. If “self-accepted” were added solely to avoid this uncertainty, then most inferential syllogisms would have this same flaw. For example, when the Mahāyāna refutes the Hīnayāna with the syllogism “particles are not truly existent, because they have obstructive form, like a jar or basin,” this too is subject to the uncertainty objection: are particles non-existent like jars and basins, or existent like the blue and yellow forms our school asserts? (pp. 0863 lower column – 0864 upper column) The phrase “now someone objects” refers to this counterargument. Based on the context, this likely reflects views held by practitioners unfamiliar with Buddhist logic after Master Shunjing’s syllogism was transmitted to China, who found Shunjing’s position plausible. Their argument runs as follows: adding the “self-accepted” qualifier is not actually intended to avoid the fallacy of uncertainty. If that were its purpose, most inferential syllogisms would suffer from the same flaw. This outsider’s argument mistakenly treats the function of “self-accepted” in Xuanzang’s True Consciousness-Only Syllogism as identical to its function in Shunjing’s contradictory syllogism. This is not an attempt to establish a self-established syllogism to form a determinate contradiction with your position. You have put forward the syllogism: “Form is definitively separate from visual consciousness; because it is included in the first three [categories of sense objects], and not included in visual consciousness; just like the eye faculty.” (p. 0864, upper column) This makes plain that the discussion is squarely focused on Shunjing’s contradictory syllogism: “The syllogism you have advanced claims form is definitively separate from visual consciousness, for the reasons you give. I have no intention of formulating a syllogism that contradicts yours whatsoever; please do not misread my position.” My syllogism has no faults such as uncertainty, and a determinate contradictory syllogism can only be formed if the opposing reason has the fault of uncertainty. Why would I bother constructing a determinate contradictory syllogism to counter yours? (p. 0864, upper column) This sentence further clarifies the point made just before. If the reason were phrased as “mutually accepted as included in the first three,” there would be no fault. But if you alter the reason, it is no longer the original syllogism, but an entirely separate, independently formulated claim. (p. 0864, upper column) Changing the reason’s qualifier from “self-accepted” to “mutually accepted” is equivalent to changing it to “mutually established” (极成), as Master Wengui notes in his Zhuangyan Commentary (《庄严疏》). The outsider claims that making this change would eliminate the fallacy of uncertainty. Master Huizhao explains that this amounts to formulating a completely new syllogism, which changes the subject of the debate—something strictly prohibited in Buddhist logical rules. Furthermore, some interpret the phrase “from the ultimate perspective, commonly established form” as not excluding the 8th and 6th [consciousnesses], taking all of them together as the thesis subject. (p. 0864, upper column) This addresses the qualifier attached to the thesis. The outsider raises the following point: under your Mahāyāna view, form is a manifestation of consciousness, so the 8th and 6th consciousnesses must also manifest form. Does the thesis subject “from the ultimate perspective, commonly established form” also include form manifested by the 8th and 6th consciousnesses? Master Huizhao explains: This interpretation is also incorrect. It incurs the fault of contradicting one’s own doctrine. How could the form manifested by the 8th and 6th consciousnesses also be considered inseparable from visual consciousness? If it were inseparable from visual consciousness, it would not take on a distinct manifest form, but would be directly apprehended by visual consciousness. (p. 0864, upper column) Master Huizhao’s explanation is actually rather roundabout. In fact, the core of this issue is simply that the outsider has confused the concepts of form (色, rūpa) and form dharmas (色法, rūpadharma). “Form” refers strictly to the objects of visual consciousness, while “form dharmas” encompasses form, sound, smell, taste, touch, the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body faculties, and form included in the mental faculty’s sphere (法处所摄色). Furthermore, the phrase “self-accepted” only serves to rule out the implicit alternative interpretations of the thesis subject; it does not claim to exclude any other factors. (p. 0864, lower column) Is this outsider’s interpretation correct? Master Huizhao responds: This also does not hold up. It incurs the fault of contradicting one’s own doctrine, or possibly the fallacy of uncertainty. How could form perceived by the 6th [consciousness], or form that is not the direct object of visual consciousness in the present moment, also be considered inseparable from visual consciousness? (p. 0864, lower column) The outsider claims that “self-accepted” only rules out the implicit alternatives of the subject—these implicit alternatives refer to both the explicit predicate of the thesis and its unstated implied meanings. Master Huizhao states this interpretation is incorrect: it could lead to either a fault of contradicting one’s own doctrine or the fallacy of uncertainty. There is no way that form perceived by the 6th consciousness, or form that is not directly apprehended by visual consciousness in the present moment, could be inseparable from visual consciousness. In this passage, “perceived by the 6th” refers to the objects of the 6th consciousness, which are in fact the form dharmas included in the mental faculty’s sphere. “Form that is not the direct object of visual consciousness” refers to form not directly apprehended by visual consciousness in the present moment. What is perceived by the 6th [consciousness] is not classified as one of the first three [categories of sense objects]. (p. 0864, lower column)

The objects of the six consciousnesses do not fall under the first three. Among the first three is rūpa (form), not rūpa-dharmas (form dharmas). The “form included in the dharma-basis” (dharmāyatanapratisaṃyukta-rūpa) apprehended by the sixth consciousness is in fact one of the form-dharmas. This closing section from Master Huizhao carries real weight. Failing to draw a clear line between “form” and “form-dharmas” leads to serious confusion, and many later readers ran into major misunderstandings of the True Consciousness-Only Syllogism precisely because they merged these two terms. After Master Huizhao, Masters Zhizhou and Daoyi also offered their own readings of the syllogism in their writings—such as Master Zhizhou’s Front Record on the Nyāyapraveśa and Rear Record on the Nyāyapraveśa. But Zhizhou’s works are little more than reading notes he compiled while studying Master Kuiji’s Great Commentary on Hetuvidya; they stay entirely within Kuiji’s interpretive frame, so we can set them aside here. As for Master Daoyi’s writings on the True Consciousness-Only Syllogism, they have not survived; we only encounter paraphrases of his views quoted in later scholars’ works.

IV. Master Yanshou's Interpretation

Master Yanshou (904–975) offered the most influential interpretation of the True Consciousness-Only Syllogism. After the Huichang Persecution, Chinese Buddhism was left badly weakened, and Buddhist logic (hetuvidyā) fell into decline; nearly all Tang-era works on the subject were lost. For centuries, the only widely available interpretation of the syllogism was the one found in Yanshou’s Zongjing Lu (Records of the Source Mirror), so his reading effectively became the standard. This remained the case until the late Qing (of course, Yanshou may have had access to some surviving Tang logical texts, but he wove his own understanding into his retelling of them). In fascicle 51 of his Zongjing Lu, Master Yanshou lays out his interpretation of the True Consciousness-Only Syllogism. The text paraphrases the syllogism’s formal structure as follows:

As the Commentary on Hetuvidya states: … The Great Master set forth the Consciousness-Only inference as follows: “Ultimately established form is the subject; it is definitely not separate from visual consciousness” is the thesis (pratijñā). The reason (hetu) reads: “Self-accepted as included in the first three, and not included in the eye [organ].” The similar example (sādharmya) is visual consciousness. The application states: “All things included in the first three and not included in the eye [organ] are definitely not separate from visual consciousness.” The similar example is visual consciousness; the dissimilar example (vaidharmya) is the eye organ. [30]

First, we do not know which Commentary on Hetuvidya Master Yanshou is citing here. Some scholars assume it is Master Kuiji’s Great Commentary on Hetuvidya, but the paraphrase Yanshou gives departs significantly from that text. What’s more, multiple works bore the title Commentary on Hetuvidya in the Tang dynasty, so there is no way to confirm the source. According to Master Yanshou, the syllogism’s formal structure should run as follows: Thesis: Ultimately established form is definitely not separate from visual consciousness. Reason: It is self-accepted as included in the first three, and not included in the eye [organ]. Example: Like visual consciousness. Up to this point, his version matches the standard True Consciousness-Only Syllogism attributed to Master Xuanzang. But Yanshou adds the following: Application: All things included in the first three and not included in the eye [organ] are definitely not separate from visual consciousness. Similar example: Like visual consciousness. Dissimilar example: Like the eye organ. On its own, this addition would not be controversial, but because Yanshou includes this second half, we need to address the questions it raises:

Question: Why does the application member only state “All things included in the first three and not included in the eye [organ] are definitely not separate from visual consciousness,” without including the phrase “accepted by oneself”? Answer: It is not part of the core reason; rather, it is a phrase appended at the start of the reason member to rule out fallacies. It does not carry the meaning “not accepted by the Hinayana, but accepted by the Mahayana.” The reason applies directly to the subject “ultimately established form,” and all three members of the syllogism are mutually accepted (though note that for the thesis member, only its basic terms are mutually accepted; the thesis as a whole cannot be). (Page 718, upper column)

Why does the application member omit the phrase “accepted by oneself”? Master Yanshou explains that the two characters zi xu (“accepted by oneself”) do not form part of the core reason. Placed at the start of the reason member, they function only to rule out potential fallacies, and do not imply “not accepted by the Hinayana, but accepted by the Mahayana.” This reason applies directly to the subject “ultimately established form,” and all three members of the entire syllogism are mutually accepted (though, of course, in the thesis member, only the basic terms of the thesis are mutually accepted; the thesis as a whole cannot be). In his breakdown of the thesis, Master Yanshou notes that of the five characters zhen gu ji cheng se (“ultimately established form”), only se (form) counts as the subject (dharmin). The remaining four characters, zhen gu ji cheng, exist solely to rule out fallacies. The two characters zhen gu (“ultimately, therefore”) guard against errors such as contradicting ordinary worldly understanding or contradicting scriptural teaching. Take the fallacy of contradicting worldly opinion: everyone knows form and consciousness are distinct. Yet the thesis claims “form is not separate from consciousness,” which seems to directly defy common sense. Why does this not count as the fallacy of contradicting worldly understanding? Master Yanshou’s explanation aligns with that of Master Kuiji and other commentators:

When setting forth an inference, there are three types: inferences for oneself, inferences for others, and shared, commonly accepted inferences. Each uses specific qualifying phrases to rule out fallacies, as appropriate. For an inference for oneself, the phrase “accepted by oneself” is used to make distinctions; for an inference directed at others, the phrase “accepted by you” is used; for a shared inference, the phrase “ultimate truth” is used. This is a shared inference, so it carries its own specific qualifications. The phrase “ultimately, therefore” signals that the thesis is grounded in ultimate truth—specifically, it is established in reference to the “truth of the manifestation of substance and function,” one of the four categories of ultimate truth. (Page 718, upper column)

We can distinguish between the worldly realm of non-scholars and the worldly realm of scholars. For the scholarly realm: the Buddha teaches in the Āgamas that form exists separately from consciousness. Now the Mahayana claims “form is not separate from consciousness.” Is this contradictory? Master Yanshou says the phrase “ultimately, therefore” makes clear this claim is grounded in Mahayana ultimate truth, so there is no contradiction. The two characters ji cheng (“established by consensus”) rule out elements of the subject that are not mutually accepted by both sides, i.e., points that are not agreed upon by all parties. Masters Wen Gui, Kuiji, and Huizhao did not spell these disputed points out in their original commentaries (though they are easy to find in other sources, such as the Treatise on the Schools). Master Yanshou, by contrast, laid them out clearly:

Of the twenty Hinayana schools, sixteen (all except the Ekavyavahārikas, Prajñaptivādins, Lokottaravādins, and Kukkuṭikas) accept the defiled (outflowing) form of the Bodhisattva in his final life, as well as the Buddha’s defiled (outflowing) form—positions the Mahayana rejects. These count as generally unestablished forms of matter. The Mahayana also posits the form of Buddhas in other realms and the Buddha’s pure (non-outflowing) form. The Sautrāntikas accept the existence of Buddhas’ form in other realms, but reject the idea that this form is pure (non-outflowing). The remaining nineteen schools reject the existence of these forms entirely. Alongside the two unestablished forms mentioned earlier, these make up the full set of disputed form categories. (Page 718, middle column)

If we omitted “established by consensus” and kept only “ultimately, therefore,” the syllogism would be invalid. Doing so would fold both mutually accepted and unaccepted forms of matter into the subject. For points the Hinayana accepts but the Mahayana rejects, the Mahayana syllogism would incur two fallacies: the “partial fallacy of the subject not being accepted by the proponent,” and the “partial fallacy of contradicting one’s own doctrine.” For points the Mahayana accepts but the Hinayana rejects, it would incur the “partial fallacy of the opponent’s subject not being accepted.” Then, when the reason member (“included in the first three, and not included in the eye [organ]”) is introduced, the fallacy of “the substratum being partially unestablished for either party” would also emerge. To avoid these four errors, the phrase “established by consensus” is essential. Turning to the predicate of the thesis—“definitely not separate from visual consciousness”—Master Yanshou says:

The predicate “definitely not separate from visual consciousness” is a mutually established, differentiating predicate. Question: Why does this not incur the fallacy of an unestablished differentiating predicate? Surely no Hinayana school holds that form is not separate from visual consciousness? Answer: We are working with the basic terms of the thesis here. It is enough that the opposing school recognizes some valid meaning of “not being separate.” The Hinayana accepts that visual consciousness apprehends form and directly grasps its substance, which implies a valid sense of “not being separate.” They also accept that visual consciousness, in its own nature, is not separate from itself. Thus there is no fallacy of an unestablished differentiating predicate. (Page 718, middle column)

The Mahayana Consciousness-Only school holds that form is “not separate from visual consciousness,” while the Sammitīya school holds it is separate. Is this not an unestablished predicate, then? In fact, this is a simple point: the fallacy of an unestablished predicate only applies when the two parties disagree on the meaning of the predicate’s terms. Here, both sides understand “not separate from visual consciousness” in the same way. At first glance, Master Yanshou’s explanation may seem overly verbose, needlessly complicating a straightforward issue. But as we read on, it becomes clear he is setting the stage for the next question:

Question: If we accept that visual consciousness apprehends its object and that this entails a meaning of “not being separate,” then when the subject and predicate are combined to form the full thesis, does this not create the fallacy of mutual support, where both parties are in agreement? Answer: There is no fallacy of mutual support. The Mahayana position here only asserts that objects are not separate from mind, and that there are no real external objects. When the subject and predicate are combined into the full thesis, the proponent (the Mahayana school) accepts it, but the opponent (the Sammitīya school) does not. (Page 718, middle column)

The so-called “fallacy of mutual support” arises when the proponent and opponent are in full agreement, essentially echoing each other’s positions. In that case, the syllogism would spark no debate, and would amount to a claim “universally accepted by all.” Master Yanshou rules out this fallacy, noting that the Mahayana asserts objects are not separate from mind and that no real, mind-independent objects exist. The core of this thesis is accepted by the proponent—the Mahayana Consciousness-Only school—but rejected by the opponent, the Sammitīya school. Master Yanshou’s analysis of the reason member begins with the core reason itself, before turning to the qualifying phrases that rule out fallacies. He divides his discussion of the core reason into two parts. First, if we drop the phrase “included in the first three” and keep only “not included in the eye [organ],” the Mahayana syllogism would read: “Ultimately established form is definitely not separate from visual consciousness; because it is not included in the eye [organ]; like visual consciousness.” This reason is too broad. The three requirements for a valid reason include the “pervasive absence in dissimilar instances” (vipakavyāpti), but this version fails that test: the “latter five groups of three” also share the property of “not included in the eye [organ],” which would produce the fallacy of uncertainty (anaikāntika). The opponent, the Sammitīya school, could then argue: Is form, the subject, like visual consciousness—which is not included in the eye organ, but cannot be separate from itself, thus proving form is not separate from visual consciousness? Or is form like the latter five groups of three—which are also not included in the eye organ, but are definitely separate from visual consciousness, thus proving form is definitely separate from visual consciousness? What, then, does the reason actually prove? After laying out this problem, Master Yanshou offers the following Q&A:

Question: Could the Mahayana now state that the latter five groups of three are also not separate from visual consciousness? Answer: If the Mahayana were to accept that the latter five groups of three are also not separate from visual consciousness, it would avoid the fallacy of uncertainty, but it would contradict their own doctrine. The Mahayana school teaches that the latter five groups of three are definitely separate from visual consciousness. Therefore, the half-reason “included in the first three” is added to preclude the latter five groups of three, as they are not included in the first three. (Page 718, lower column)

In other words: what if the Mahayana were to claim the latter five groups of three are also not separate from visual consciousness? Master Yanshou replies that if the Mahayana took this position, it would dodge the fallacy of uncertainty, but would contradict its own doctrine, which holds that the latter five groups of three are definitely separate from visual consciousness. That said, the question Master Yanshou poses here comes off as rather naive, and seems to underestimate his opponent. No serious debater would raise such a point. Second, if we omit “not included in the eye [organ]” and keep only “included in the first three,” the syllogism would read: “Ultimately established form is definitely not separate from visual consciousness; because it is included in the first three; like visual consciousness.” This reason is also too broad. It again fails the “pervasive absence in dissimilar instances” requirement of the three characteristics of a valid reason, because the dissimilar instances also share the property of “included in the first three.” The Sammitīya school could then argue: Is the subject, like visual consciousness, included in the first three, and visual consciousness is not separate from itself, thus proving form is not separate from consciousness? Or is the subject, like the eye organ—which is also included in the first three, but is not “definitely not separate” from visual consciousness—thus proving that form is “not definitely not separate” from visual consciousness? Master Yanshou uses the phrase “not definitely not separate” rather than “definitely separate” because, in Mahayana doctrine, the eye organ is not “definitely separate” from visual consciousness. Calling it separate is only an expedient teaching. The term “not separate” here means the eye organ is the cause that generates the activity of visual consciousness: the organ is the cause, consciousness is the effect, and cause and effect are not separate. But form and mind are ultimately distinct entities, so they are also described as “not identical” (non-identical). Because they are neither identical nor separate, the text describes their relationship as “not definitely not separate.” Using only “included in the first three” without the phrase “not included in the eye [organ]” would also open the syllogism to the fallacy of a definite contradiction with the inherent nature of the property (dharmasvabhāva-viruddha). Master Yanshou’s explanation of this fallacy is quite original:

Second, on the fallacy of a definite contradiction with the inherent nature of the property: the “inherent nature of the property” refers to the intrinsic characteristic of the predicate stated in the thesis. “Definite contradiction” means the reason directly opposes the thesis. An opponent could advance a contradictory syllogism: “Ultimately established form is the subject; it is not separate from visual consciousness” is the thesis. The reason is “because it is included in the first three.” The example is “like the eye organ.” In other words, the opponent swaps the similar and dissimilar examples of the original syllogism, using the original dissimilar example as the similar example, and vice versa. (Page 718, lower column – Page 719, upper column)

When Master Yanshou describes this swap of examples, he is referring exactly to the “similarity of similar dharmas” and “similarity of dissimilar dharmas” outlined in the Nyāyamukha. These terms simply refer to the move of replacing a similar example (dharma) with a dissimilar one, and vice versa. Does this move truly count as a “contradiction with the inherent nature of the property”? Master Yanshou says it does not constitute a genuine refutation. His reasoning: for a syllogism to qualify as a contradiction of the property’s inherent nature, the proponent must have the characteristic present in the similar instance and absent in the dissimilar instance, while the opponent must have it absent in the similar instance and present in the dissimilar instance. Only under these conditions does a true contradiction of the property’s inherent nature arise. In this case, however, both the proponent and opponent have the characteristic present in both the similar and dissimilar examples. While Master Yanshou uses different terminology than Master Kuiji here, the two meanings are identical. Next, Master Yanshou takes up the question of whether this move counts as a “definite contradiction.” Master Kuiji’s commentary held that it could qualify as a definite contradiction, citing three associated fallacies. Master Yanshou, by contrast, explicitly rules out the possibility of a definite contradiction arising here.

As for the fallacy of definite contradiction paired with uncertainty: the proponent and opponent debate a single subject using different reasons and examples. Both sides’ syllogisms meet the three formal requirements—the reason is pervasive in the subject, present in all similar instances, and absent in all dissimilar instances. But neither syllogism generates clear, correct knowledge for the other side, leaving both parties in doubt, unable to definitively establish their position. This is what is called the fallacy of definite contradiction and uncertainty. In the case of “ultimately established form,” while both sides debate the same subject, the reason is mutually accepted, and both sides fail to meet the third requirement (pervasive absence in dissimilar instances). Thus this is not the fallacy of definite contradiction and uncertainty. (Page 719, upper column)

This amounts to a correction of an error in Master Kuiji’s commentary, which claims the contradiction is “merely a rhetorical flourish by the commentator… not a genuine logical flaw.” As for why the qualifying phrase “accepted by oneself” must be added to the reason member, Master Yanshou explains that Xuanzang’s (the Tripitaka Master’s) original syllogism incurs the fallacy of contradicting the implied distinction within the subject. The phrase “accepted by oneself” is added to rule out this error. Why does Master Yanshou say Xuanzang’s syllogism has this flaw? He notes that while the distinction is not stated explicitly in the subject term, it is implied in the proponent’s intended meaning. He elaborates:

The Mahayana school posits two types of form: the objective, mind-independent form that exists separately from visual consciousness, and the mental image form that is not separate from visual consciousness. The Hinayana accepts the existence of the former, mind-independent form, but rejects the latter, mind-dependent form. (Page 719, upper column)

In this passage, four key terms appear: “form that exists apart from eye consciousness as fundamental essence” (离眼识本质色), “form that does not exist apart from eye consciousness as perceived aspect” (不离眼识相分色), “form apart from eye consciousness” (离眼识色), and “form not apart from eye consciousness” (不离眼识色). What do these four terms refer to? This is a critical question, as it directly shapes how we read everything that follows.

Working from the phrases “the Hīnayāna accepts” (小乘即许) and “the Hīnayāna does not accept” (小乘不许), we can parse their meanings here: “the Hīnayāna accepts” refers to positions shared by both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna (since the prior line notes that “the Mahāyāna school holds there are two kinds of form”), while “the Hīnayāna does not accept” refers to claims only the Mahāyāna endorses, which the Hīnayāna rejects. The forms both traditions agree exist are, simply put, everyday objects like tables and chairs. In Mahāyāna thought, these count as the perceived aspect (nimitta-bhāga, 相分) of consciousness, and there is no perceived aspect that exists independently of eye consciousness at all. This means the shared, everyday objects like tables are what the Mahāyāna calls “form not apart from eye consciousness as perceived aspect,” and what the Hīnayāna calls “form apart from eye consciousness.”

Most readers, however, parse Master Yanshou’s sentence as: “The Mahāyāna school holds there are two types of form: form existing apart from eye consciousness as fundamental essence, and form not apart from eye consciousness as perceived aspect. As for form apart from eye consciousness (fundamental essence), the Hīnayāna accepts it; as for form not apart from eye consciousness (perceived aspect), the Hīnayāna does not accept it.” No matter how you read it, Master Yanshou’s claim is wrong and makes no logical sense. What’s more, the “form existing apart from eye consciousness as fundamental essence” the Mahāyāna describes is just the seeds stored in the ālaya-consciousness. Since the Hīnayāna rejects the ālaya-consciousness entirely, it would never accept this category of “form apart from eye consciousness as fundamental essence” in the first place.

If we map the Mahāyāna’s two categories—“form apart from eye consciousness as fundamental essence” and “form not apart from eye consciousness as perceived aspect”—onto the Hīnayāna’s pair of “form apart from eye consciousness” and “form not apart from eye consciousness,” the categories align in reverse: the Mahāyāna’s “form apart from eye consciousness as fundamental essence” matches the Hīnayāna’s “form not apart from eye consciousness,” while the Mahāyāna’s “form not apart from eye consciousness as perceived aspect” matches the Hīnayāna’s “form apart from eye consciousness.” Master Yanshou’s wording is very easy to misinterpret.

In the Ruiyuan Ji (瑞源记), a passage from the now-lost Yifan (义范) is quoted: “The Mahāyāna self-accepts that the fundamental-essence form of eye consciousness is called “form apart from consciousness,” and the perceived-aspect form is called “form not apart from consciousness.” [31]” This is the earliest known appearance of the term “fundamental-essence form” (本质色). According to the Catalogue of Hetuvidyā Root and Branch Sūtras, Śāstras, and Commentaries listed at the end of the Ruiyuan Ji, the Yifan ran three juan and was written by Tang dynasty monk Daoyi of Kaiyuan Temple. I got this detail wrong in my earlier piece “Examples of Master Ouyi’s Successes and Failures in Hetuvidyā.” [32]

Now the Tripiṭaka Master puts forward his inference: The subject is “true, ultimately established form.” If we take the explicitly stated self-characteristic of the subject, it refers to a form both the proponent and opponent accept. When he adduces the reason “included in the first triad but not included in the sense of eye [consciousness],” he is only establishing that this commonly accepted form does not depart from eye consciousness. If we look at what the Tripiṭaka Master intends to prove, he is only establishing that perceived-aspect form does not depart from eye consciousness, using that same reason to prove the intended distinction tied to the subject: that perceived-aspect form definitely does not depart from eye consciousness. This is why the Hetuvidyā Commentary states: “True, ultimately established form” is the self-characteristic of the subject; “form that definitely does not depart from eye consciousness” is the self-characteristic of the predicate; “form that definitely departs from eye consciousness” and “form that does not definitely depart from eye consciousness” are the two possible distinctions of the subject. What the proponent intends to prove is form that does not depart from eye consciousness. (Column a–b, page 0719)

This passage also makes clear that the line “The Mahāyāna school holds there are two kinds of form: form apart from eye consciousness as fundamental essence, and form not apart from eye consciousness as perceived aspect. Form apart from eye consciousness is accepted by the Hīnayāna; form not apart from eye consciousness is not accepted by the Hīnayāna” should be parsed with the parenthetical clarifications: “As for form apart from eye consciousness (fundamental essence), the Hīnayāna accepts it; as for form not apart from eye consciousness (perceived aspect), the Hīnayāna does not accept it.” But because Master Yanshou misread the Yogācāra concept of “form” (rūpa), all his subsequent reasoning is flawed.

Next, Master Yanshou lays out a Q&A to address a potential critique: “Question: When an opponent claims the Tripiṭaka Master’s inference commits a fault of contradiction with the subject, how does the phrase “self-accepted” (zi xu) counter this? Answer: When the opponent puts forward their contradictory inference, the two characters “self-accepted” are used to expose a fault of inconclusiveness in their reasoning. Since the opponent’s inference is already flawed, what basis is there to claim the Tripiṭaka Master’s inference has a fault of contradiction regarding the subject’s distinction?” (Column b, page 0719) Master Yanshou clearly means this Q&A to defend Master Xuanzang, but it backfires spectacularly, only making Xuanzang look worse. Later scholars like Shen Jianying would launch fierce attacks on Xuanzang—all stemming from Master Yanshou’s mistakes.

Master Yanshou then asks, “What does the contradictory inference the Hīnayāna puts forward look like?” His answer, however, is built on a fundamental misunderstanding of Mahāyāna Yogācāra, so he gets caught up in roundabout, muddled reasoning. For instance, he writes: “The Hīnayāna says that at first glance, the proponent’s explicitly stated self-characteristic shows no fault in the three branches of the syllogism, but when you look closely at what is actually being proven, it turns out to be an implicitly intended claim. If, regarding the intended distinction on the subject, one uses the reason and example to prove that the intended perceived-aspect form of the subject does not depart from eye consciousness...” The phrase “the intended perceived-aspect form not departing from eye consciousness” here is already wrong. The rest of his reasoning—“eye consciousness cannot serve as a similar example... if it cannot serve as a similar example, it becomes a dissimilar example. Thus the reason “included in the first triad, etc.” reverses and applies to the dissimilar example of eye consciousness”—is also incorrect.

Yanshou goes on to claim: “Without changing the proponent’s reason, the Hīnayāna presents a contradictory inference: the subject is “true, ultimately established form”; the thesis is “not form that does not depart from eye consciousness”; the reason is “because it is included in the first triad and not included in the sense of eye [consciousness]”; the similar example is eye consciousness.” This syllogism is in fact the one the Saṃmitīya school used to refute Mahāyāna Yogācāra theoreticians. Master Xuanzang only added the qualifying phrase “self-accepted” (zi xu) to the reason branch precisely because the syllogism the Yogācāra theoreticians had put forward was flawed. So Yanshou’s claim that “the Tripiṭaka Master’s inference commits the fault of contradiction regarding the subject’s distinction” is wrong. It was the Yogācāra theoreticians’ syllogism that had this fault, not Xuanzang’s.

After laying out the three branches of the syllogism—thesis, reason, and example—Yanshou adds an “application” (he, 合) branch: “Application: all things included in the first triad but not included in the sense of eye [consciousness] are not form that does not depart from eye consciousness.” He immediately clarifies: “The word “not” (fēi, 非) means “nonexistent” (wú, 无).” From the perspective of Buddhist Hetuvidyā, this is also incorrect: fēi (“is not”) and wú (“nonexistent”) are entirely distinct logical terms, and fēi cannot be read as wú in this context.

The Hīnayāna states, “There is no form that does not depart from eye consciousness,” meaning it rejects the existence of the Tripiṭaka Master’s intended perceived-aspect form. (Column b, page 0719)

This line contains at least two errors. First, the phrase “there is no form not apart from eye consciousness” uses the wrong term: the Saṃmitīya school’s original claim used “not” (fēi, 非), not “nonexistent” (wú, 无). In Buddhist Hetuvidyā, fēi (“is not”) and wú (“nonexistent”) are completely distinct logical terms. Second, the reference to “the Tripiṭaka Master’s intended perceived-aspect form” is wrong: what was being rejected was the syllogism put forward by the Mahāyāna Yogācāra theoreticians, not Xuanzang’s own work. The Tripiṭaka Master (Xuanzang) himself had already spotted the flaw in the Yogācāra theoreticians’ syllogism.

Master Yanshou’s mistakes are largely concentrated in this long passage where he explains the term “self-accepted” (zi xu).

Other ancient commentaries on the True Consciousness-Only Syllogism include works from Ming dynasty figures: Master Ouyi, Master Mingyu, and lay scholar Wang Kentang. I have already covered these in a separate article, so I will skip them here. These Ming texts have little of value, as their authors all take Master Yanshou’s Zongjing Lu (宗镜录) as their foundation, inheriting and developing his errors.

Notes: [1] Some editions render the thesis branch of Xuanzang’s True Consciousness-Only Syllogism as “True, ultimately established form does not depart from eye consciousness.” [2] The eighteen dhātus (six sense consciousnesses: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind; six sense faculties: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind; six sense objects: form, sound, odor, taste, tactile, mental objects) are grouped into six triads: the first triad (初三) consists of eye faculty, eye consciousness, and form object; the second (二三) of ear faculty, ear consciousness, and sound object; the third (三三) of nose faculty, nose consciousness, and odor object; the fourth (四三) of tongue faculty, tongue consciousness, and taste object; the fifth (五三) of body faculty, body consciousness, and tactile object; and the sixth (六三) of mental faculty, mental consciousness, and mental object. [3] Refers to the eye faculty. [4] Mr. Lü Cheng observes that “the Gui commentary preserves Master Xuanzang’s oral teachings quite faithfully.” See Zhuangyan Shu (Commentary from Zhuangyan Temple), juan 4, p. 37, yang side (note appended by the proofreader). [5] See Taishō Tripiṭaka, vol. 44, p. 0100, column b. [6] See Taishō Tripiṭaka, vol. 44, p. 0145, column b. [7] The Xuzangjing (Manji Supplement to the Buddhist Canon), vol. 86, p. 0686, reads 根所不摄 (“not included in the faculty”) here. [8] See Yinming Ru Zheng Lilun Shu (Commentary on the Nyāyapraveśa), juan 2, p. 21, yin side. (As Wengui resided at Great Zhuangyan Temple, this commentary is commonly known as the Zhuangyan Shu.) Xinwenfeng Publishing Co., first edition, July 1977. [9] “Buddha’s form-body from other lands” (他方佛色) refers to the physical bodies of buddhas in realms outside the Sahā world, such as Amitābha of the Western Pure Land and Bhaiṣajyaguru (Medicine Buddha) of the Eastern Pure Land, among others. [10] See Zhuangyan Shu, juan 4, p. 37, yang side (note appended by the proofreader). [11] I follow the original text of the Zhuangyan Shu I have at hand here, using the translation “self-accepted” for zi xu. This term can be paired with “form that is not consciousness” to form a coherent phrase. [12] Same as above. This “self-accepted” can be paired with “form that is consciousness” to form a coherent phrase. [13] Zhuangyan Shu, juan 2, p. 22, yang side. [14] The Hīnayāna tradition holds that Śākyamuni Buddha practiced the bodhisattva path for many lifetimes before attaining buddhahood in this life. Before his final awakening, he married and had children, so his physical body was not perfectly pure and untainted. This is generally referred to as “the defiled form of the last-existence bodhisattva” or “the Buddha’s tainted form.” [15] Refers to Master Xuanzang’s True Consciousness-Only Syllogism. [16] Zhuangyan Shu, juan 4, p. 13, yin side. [17] Same as above, line 8. [18] Zhuangyan Shu, juan 4, pp. 13 yin to 14 yang. [19] The so-called “fault of partial failure of one’s own subject” (一分自所别不成过): the term “partial” (一分) here does not refer to the entire subject of the thesis—form (rūpa)—but only a subset, specifically the “defiled form of the last-existence bodhisattva” and similar cases. “Subject” (所别) refers to the subject of the syllogism’s thesis. “One’s own subject is not established” means the Mahāyāna side itself does not recognize this subset as valid. In a Hetuvidyā inference, the subject of the thesis must be accepted by both parties. Since the Mahāyāna does not accept this portion of form, it constitutes the “fault of partial failure of one’s own subject.” Kuiji records it as “一分自所别不成过,” but the more common phrasing is “自一分所别不成过.” [20] This refers to the fact that a portion of form (such as the form-bodies of buddhas from other realms) is not accepted by the opposing side, the Hīnayāna. [21] This refers to the second triad (ear faculty, ear consciousness, sound object), third triad (nose faculty, nose consciousness, odor object), fourth triad (tongue faculty, tongue consciousness, taste object), fifth triad (body faculty, body consciousness, tactile object), and sixth triad (mental faculty, mental consciousness, mental object)—not, as some misread it, the fifth triad alone (body faculty, body consciousness, tactile object). [22] This line reads “contradiction with the self-characteristic of the dharma” (法自相相违), while twelve lines above it reads “determining contradiction with the self-characteristic of the dharma” (法自相决定相违). The two terms are equivalent. The inconsistency is likely due to Kuiji not finishing drafting the text, so the terminology was not standardized. [23] See Taishō Tripiṭaka, vol. 32, p. 0011, column b. [24] In his Yinming Da Shu (Great Commentary on Hetuvidyā) and Cheng Weishi Lun Zhangzhong Shuyao (Essentials of the Cheng Weishi Lun), Kuiji attributes this syllogism to Master Shunjing. However, Zhenju’s Meitōshō (明灯抄) and other sources credit it to Master Wônhyo. There is no definitive proof either way, but I believe it is more likely Wônhyo’s work. Shunjing’s role was only to transmit this syllogism to China. [25] See Taishō Tripiṭaka, vol. 30, p. 0215, column a. [26] “The consciousness of accomplishing deeds” (成事智) is a reference to the kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna (成所作智, “consciousness of accomplishing deeds”) from the doctrine of transforming consciousness into wisdom. [27] The Ruiyuan Ji reads “greatly conflicting and contradictory” (甚相乖角) here. [28] Xuzangjing (Manji Supplement to the Buddhist Canon), vol. 86, p. 0863, column b. [29] The Xuzangjing original text reads 既 (ji) here; 即 (ji, “namely”) would be a more accurate rendering. [30] Taishō Tripiṭaka, vol. 48, p. 0718, column a. [31] See Yinming Lun Shu Ruiyuan Ji, juan 48, yin side; p. 256 by modern pagination. Published by Zhi Zhe Publishing House. [32] Published in Chinese Culture Studies (中国文化研究), 2003, issue 4.